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ABSTRACT
The central claim of this thesis is that physicalism is not well supported 
by our scientific knowledge. The argument splits into four sections. In 
section I, I argue that given the current state of science a reductive 
version of physicalism cannot be maintained, if theoretical reductions are 
thought to be obtainable in practice. In section II, I argue that physicalists 
who are realists about higher-order properties are committed to reduction 
in principle of these properties to physics. In section III, I argue that one 
of the core elements of physicalist philosophy, the completeness of 
physics, is highly questionable in light of certain features of quantum 
theory. In the final section, I survey a range of possible alternatives 
ontologies to physicalism and argue for a pluralistic ontology.
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INTRODUCTION
Physicalism is an ontological thesis. In its broadest and most general sense, it 
claims that physical “stuff’ and physical properties constitute the whole world.1 
Physicalism is the philosophical orthodoxy in all matters metaphysical. It is a view 
that dictates the nature of research which many philosophers pursue, whether it be in 
the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science or some other discipline. However,
1 take it that physicalism is not a doctrine which is intuitively obvious. It is presumably 
a position that can be doubted and hence must be argued for. There are good ways and 
bad ways in which this might be done. We might consider a few of the bad ways first.2
Some physicalists might claim that their ontological position is motivated by 
simplicity or elegance -  philosophical good taste decrees we should avoid the messy 
world of pluralistic ontologies. I do not find that argument remotely convincing. I do 
not see any a priori reason why God should have fashioned the world for Stoics rather 
than Epicureans. However, even if we do suppose it is a reasonable argument, it must 
have as much (or as little) force in the mouth of any other monistic philosopher. Why 
couldn’t an idealist equally well claim his ontology was the simplest? A good 
argument for physicalism must have more bite.
Another argument physicalists might proffer is that only physicalism wards off 
philosophical disreputables -  that is, “spooky” properties like Cartesian souls. But 
again I can not see why such a line of argument should persuade anyone. After all, 
what is a spooky property? Are the exotic properties of subatomic particles -  spin, 
strangeness, charm -  spooky? Certainly they are much less familiar than the sorts of 
properties non-physicalists might claim are not actually physical, viz. intentional 
properties. Indeed, it seems clear that what one does or does not decree spooky is
11 take it that physicalists can remain neutral on certain questions, for example the existence of abstract 
objects such as numbers.
2 The arguments I present here are anaemic versions of the summary of possible reasons John 
Haugeland, [1984] provides for phyicalism. Of course, I do not suggest that Haugeland himself finds 
such arguments, even in their full-blodded form, convincing.
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usually decided after one has adopted a particular ontological position. Berkeley, for 
one, found incomprehensible the idea that inert matter could cause anything. For him 
materialism, the ancestor of physicalism, was a spooky theory. Spookiness, by 
physicalist lights, then does not appear to mean much more than non-physical; and 
while it is true that physicalism is the philosophical position which guards against the 
non-physical, that statement, by itself, is unlikely to have much persuasive force.
Any self-respecting physicalist should be embarrassed by these arguments. The 
real motivation for physicalism must come from somewhere else or one could not 
account for the widespread acceptance of the view within the philosophical 
community. I think what really drives the physicalist consensus is a deep respect for 
the natural sciences. In fact, I think physicalism has its roots in two other philosophical 
positions: scientific realism and naturalism. Scientific realism is the doctrine which 
asserts the way science describes the world is true or nearly true. Naturalism has a 
technical usage in philosophy associated with Quine: in essence it involves the denial 
of a priori knowledge. However, I use the term here in a much broader sense. I take 
naturalism to be the attitude that we should seek within the natural sciences for 
answers to our philosophical questions and we should judge our philosophically 
favoured theories against what the natural sciences say. One does not need to look 
hard to find physicalists proclaiming allegiance to both these views:
Materialist metaphysicians wish to side with physics (Lewis [1983], p.364)
Broadly empirical in character, they [physicalist claims] are supported inductively by scientific 
practice. (Heilman and Thompson [1977], p.311)
According to contemporary physicalists, the principles of physicalism are to be treated as high- 
level empirical hypotheses or generalizations...If phenomena turn up which resist a naturalist
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account even after years of trying, then the physicalists principles should be rejected or revised.
(Post, J. [1991] p.75)
None of these quotes of course offer actual arguments, only intentions. But if 
these intentions could be realised, if physicalists could argue from the sciences to their 
favoured ontological position, that would be a powerful consideration in their favour. 
Such an argument might take a number of forms. The most complete form of 
justification from science would be to show that the physics does actually explain all 
the events of the universe. In other words, if we could show that all true theories 
reduced to physics, then we would know that physicalism is true. This has not been 
done. A close second as a way of motivating physicalism would be to show that given 
the state of science, we should expect reductions of other scientific disciplines to 
physics. This is an historically important position, associated with the so-called unity 
of science programme. If it were feasible it would provide strong grounds for being a 
physicalist. However, I shall show in section I that the current state of science cannot 
support the reductive programme.
A still less ambitious means of arguing for physicalism would eschew the 
possibility of actual theoretical reductions. Indeed, this view, what is called non- 
reductive physicalism, is probably the most popular version of physicalism touted by 
philosophers today. Such physicalists will have to provide some explanation of what 
the relation between physics and the other sciences is, if it is not reductive. They will 
also need to show, if they wish to claim their physicalism has naturalistic roots, that 
they have some argument for physicalism which emerges from physics itself.3 I shall 
argue that neither of these aims can be achieved. In section II, I shall demonstrate that 
non-reductive physicalists, insofar as they are physicalists, are committed to 
reductions in principle. Section III will argue that if we take current physics itself at all
3 This argument will of course apply equally to those who call themselves eliminativists
6
seriously it, if anything, undermines physicalism, rather than lending it support. These 
arguments will not refute physicalism but they should persuade the reader that 
physicalism has little support from the natural sciences.
By rejecting physicalism, though, we need not reject the realist or naturalist 
pillars on which it is built. In fact, it will be my contention in the final section that we 
can build an ontology that is not physicalistic but is still in keeping with the idea that 
our metaphysical views should emerge from our scientific theories. Hence, it will be 
this view rather than physicalism that has the honour of being scientifically 
respectable.
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THE LIMITS OF REDUCTION
The issue we are concerned with here is theoretical reduction. Or to put it 
another way, when does one theory reduce to another? We are interested in theoretical 
reduction inasmuch as it is a motivation for physicalism. The reductionist hopes to be 
able to explain bigger things in terms of smaller things. He hopes to account for 
humans (and other animals) in terms of biology, biology in terms of chemistry and 
chemistry in terms of physics. The ideal end for someone who advocates reductionism 
as a means of formulating their physicalist views is that all non-physical theories 
should be explicable in terms of the one fundamental theory, physics (or 
microphysics). It will be my task to demonstrate that actual reductions between 
various sciences are unlikely, or impossible. Thus physicalism cannot be argued for as 
a corollary of the unity of science programme.
This section splits broadly into two sub-sections. The first sub-section is 
concerned mainly with what a reduction is. I shall argue that we have no good formal 
account of theoretical reduction. In the second sub-section, I shall address the question 
whether we have good reasons to believe that reductions are likely to be forthcoming 
in the sciences; I shall show we do not, and therefore one possible way of arguing for 
physicalism will have been undermined. Obviously one reason for thinking that 
reductions are in practice unfeasible is because we have no good formal model of 
reduction. However, I will argue even if we employ vaguer, more intuitive 
conceptions of reduction, then we have reason to believe that there will 
insurmountable obstacles for the reductionist programme to overcome.
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Models of Reduction
A classical positivist gloss on reduction4 suggests that all that is required for one 
theory, let us call it A, to be reduced to another, B, is that all the observational 
consequences of A should also be consequences of B. We conceive of B as the 
reducing theory since we take it to be superior to A in some appropriate way; it may 
have more verified observational consequences or posit fewer theoretical entities, for 
example. The positivist view makes no attempt to connect the ontologies of the two 
theories. In fact, it empties both theories of all their ontological content, making A and 
B merely instruments for generating predictions. But that cannot be the sort of model 
of reduction that suits physicalists ends for it seems to eschew entirely ontological 
questions. An argument for physicalism driven by reductionist considerations must 
take the theories in question to say something about how the world actually is.5 Such 
an argument requires a notion of reduction that provides for stronger metaphysical 
commitments than is offered by positivism.
Perhaps the best known account of reduction that allows for a more realistic 
treatment of theories is Ernest Nagel's.6 On his view the reduced theory must be 
derivable from the reducing theory. That is to say, the laws or an appropriate subset of 
the laws can be deduced from the laws of the reducing theory with the aid of some 
additional assumptions. These additional assumptions in some way connect or bridge 
the ontological and conceptual divide between the two theories. So for example, 
although it is true that neither physics nor chemistry makes mention of biological 
entities like testosterone, this does not mean biology is irreducible to physics and 
chemistry. One may introduce what Nagel called a bridge law that identifies or states
4 For example Kemney and Oppenheim[1956]
5 This is not to deny that the sorts of conditions set out by Kemney and Oppenheim need not be 
fulfilled, rather we demand to to understand more clearly what the relation between the two theories’ 
ontologies is.
necessary or perhaps even only sufficient physio-chemical conditions for the presence 
of the biochemical. Indeed, as Nagel points out, logic demands that we introduce such 
bridge laws for without these principles there would be no way of deriving one theory 
from another, if the two theories contained different terms. Nevertheless, one might 
feel that if the reduction really were complete, we would expect the reducing theory to 
explain somehow the existence of the bridging law. That is to say, we do not want the 
bridge laws to be fundamental or on a par with the laws of the reducing theory. Rather 
they should be themselves explained, either by the reducing theory or in some other 
way which makes their appearance non-problematic. If no such explanation is offered, 
then we may become suspicious that the bridge laws, rather than the supposedly 
fundamental theory do the real work in the derivation.7 In fact, without any obvious 
constraints placed on the bridging laws by the reducing theory, one can simply 
contrive to "reduce" almost any theory to any other. Consider, for example, theory A, 
that all Englishmen are bad losers and theory B, the inverse square law of gravitation. 
One can derive theory B from theory A (and hence on Nagel’s model reduce B to A) 
simply by introducing the bridge law A->B. Nagel’s account appears to make 
reduction trivial.
An obvious response to the above problem, put forward most forcibly by
Q Q
Robert Causey , is to insist that only identity statements (as opposed to mere 
equivalences or even weaker conditions) which connect property attributes (or natural 
kind terms) will count as bridge laws. Such a view clearly satisfies our desire to 
account for the bridge principles, since an identity statement, unlike a law, does not 
beg explanation from the reducing theory. If water is actually H2O, then one does not
6 Nagel, E. [1962.] See also Hempel, C. [1966] Ch.8
7 Cartwright, N. [1981] expresses the same concerns about the role of bridge laws in connecting abstract 
fundamental physical laws to real concrete situations.
8 Causey, R. ,[1977]
9 Of course, there are some subtlies to be cleared up concerning the status of identity statements, 
whether they are necessary or contingent. And if necessary what sort of necessity : logical, metaphysical,
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need to explain why wherever there is water there is H2O. (Although, of course, one 
would expect there to be some justification for positing the identity statement in the 
first place.) Even identity statements, though, are not uncontroversial in the context of 
reductions. Often when the identity is posited there will be some features of the 
reduced property or entity that will be lost. For example, it is arguably a property of 
natural light that it appears to us to be a certain colour. But it does not appear to be a 
property of any frequency of electromagnetic radiation, as described by Maxwell’s 
theory, that light appears any way to us at all. Maxwell’s equations have nothing to 
say about the qualitative aspects of light. Yet many philosophers and scientists are still 
happy to assert that light is electromagnetic radiation.10 Reductionists would hope, of 
course, that these missing properties, these secondary qualities, would eventually be 
explained away in the context of some other theory or some broader reduction. In this 
case, one would expect some explanation in terms of the physiology of the human 
sensory systems. Ultimately of course, for the advocate of the unity of science 
programme, all the theories should be explicable in terms of the ultimate physical 
theory.
Thus far I have given a fairly broad and abstract sketch of reductionist 
models and possible problems they might face. The only method of assessing the value 
of any model of reduction in detail is to consider putative examples of theory 
reduction from the history of science. First, I wish to examine the supposed reduction 
of Kepler's theory of planetary motion to Newtonian mechanics. This reduction 
involves two theories that clearly cover the same sort of phenomena; it is a reduction 
within physics (or astronomy). The purpose here is to demonstrate the problems of 
providing an adequate Nagel/Causey-style reduction for any proposed case of
physical? I do not have space to to do justice to these difficult questions. One should note though that 
Causey himself believes identity statements are at least logically contingent.
10 This is a consequence of the asymmetry of the reduction. Since one description of the entity or 
property is deemed fundamental, that of die reducing theory, any aspect of the reduced theory 
description that does not fit is deemed “unreal” in some sense.
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theoretical reduction. It will also allow us to consider possible extensions of the Nagel- 
model which have been suggested. I shall then turn to assess the reduction of 
chemistry to physics. Having shown the limitations of the Nagel-model, this case 
study should achieve two aims. Firstly, it will provide a structure to suggest weaker 
and vaguer accounts of theoretical reduction. Secondly, it will show that even these 
weak accounts do not apply to the relation between chemistry and physics and thus, 
chemistry must, for several reasons, be considered an autonomous non-reduced 
discipline.
The reduction of Kepler's laws to Newtonian mechanics
The claim that Newton's theory subsumes Kepler's goes almost unchallenged. 
Even a sceptic about reductionist programmes like Popper is prepared to admit, 
"Newton's theory was a completely successful reduction of Kepler's"11. It is this 
uncontroversial status as a successful reduction that makes it a particularly useful test 
case for models of reduction.
Prima facie, the reduction seems to fit well with the Nagel model. From the 
principles of Newtonian mechanics it is fairly elementary to deduce Kepler's three 
laws of planetary motion. For example, Kepler's first law, that the planets move in 
ellipses with the sun at one focus, can be deduced simply by considering the effect of 
two bodies interacting under a central force proportional to one over the distance 
squared. (In other words, interacting under the gravitational force.) In fact there does 
not appear to be any need to invoke bridge laws for the theoretical terms found in 
Kepler’s laws, the orbits of the planets, etc., are also found in Newtonian mechanics. 
However, this relatively smooth mathematical reduction belies a conceptual 
revolution. According to Kepler's theory, some force emanating from the sun pushes 
the planets round their orbits, whereas, the orbital motion in Newtonian mechanics is 
explained in terms of the mutual attraction of two bodies. The ontologies of the two
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theories seem to contradict one another, there is no intuitively obvious sense in which 
we can say one of the theories reduces or approximates to the other. The two theories 
simply appear to contradict one another; if Newton's theory is correct, Kepler's is plain 
wrong.12 Indeed the problem is more acute, if one believes, as many do, that the 
meaning of theoretical terms is wholly derived from their place within the total theory. 
If one accepts this form of semantic holism it becomes difficult to resist the conclusion 
that the entities named in two differing theories, even if they have the same name, 
refer to different objects. Therefore, one theory cannot intelligibly be compared to 
another. It follows then that the models of reduction we have briefly considered will 
be wholly inadequate. That is to say, a Nagel-style derivation can not properly 
speaking be a reduction of one theory to another, since the set of laws derived from the 
reducing theory (Newton’s in this case) will have a different meaning from the laws of 
the supposedly reduced theory (Kepler’s laws) . 13 14 Or even if we do not accept this 
more extreme view, we still must acknowledge that the two theories are mutually 
inconsistent. One cannot possibly derive a theory from another when the two are 
inconsistent (save in the trivial respect by adding inconsistent premises) and so no 
Nagel-style reduction is possible.
A model of reduction put forward by C.A. Hooker15 and Paul and Patricia 
Churchland16 attempts to address these problems in a way which does not deviate 
greatly from the original Nagel model. These philosophers maintain like Nagel that a 
reduction involves the deduction of one theory from another. However, they do not
11 Popper, [1982] p.172
12 Even the mathematical derivation requires some qualification. Kepler’s laws purport to refer to the 
actual motion of the planets but the deduction of the first law offered in Newtonian mechanics is only a 
mathematical idealisation. The actual orbits of the planets deviate from ellipses due to the perturbations 
of the other planets, most notably Jupiter.
13 See Kuhn, T. [1970], for the classic account of incommensurability.
14 Nagel distinguishes two types of reduction:hetergeneous and homogeneous. The former involve 
theories which have different vocabularies, and therefore require bridge laws, and the latter are 
reductions of theories that have the same vocabulary. To take the incommensurabilist seriously is to 
deny that there can ever be two different homogeneous theories.
15 Hooker, C.A. [1981]
16 Churchland, P.M. [1985], Churchland, P. S. [1986]
13
take the theory deduced from the reducing theory to be identical to the reduced theory. 
It will be rather, an equipotent image of the reduced theory. To put it more formally, if 
we have some theory, H, which is reduced to another T, then we can deduce some 
theory T(H) from T with some additional assumptions.17 But T(H) does not equal H, 
although it is formally and metaphysically similar to the theory, H. Hence, we are 
apparently able to reconcile the fact that H and T are mutually inconsistent theories 
with the fact that we want to say H reduces to T. That said, it is not clear to me that 
the Hooker/Churchlands model solves the problems I have raised. In fact, it seems to 
me if anything to make them more perspicuous. If the deduced theory is not the 
supposedly reduced theory but something else on what basis do we say that one theory 
has reduced to the other at all? What we appear to have is a straightforward case of 
theory elimination. The real question which has to be addressed by this account is: 
what is the actual connection between the reduced theory and the image deduced from 
the reducing theory? What, in short, motivates calling it a reduction rather than an 
elimination?
When the dilemma between reduction and elimination is put as starkly as this, 
we can see that an account of inter-theoretic reduction must address the same 
problems philosophers of science tackle in discussions of revolutionary theory 
change.18 Furthermore, we can interpret the eliminativist and reductionist responses to 
the problem of reduction, as parallel to realist and anti-realist19 accounts of scientific 
revolutions. The reductionists and realists are conservatives together: both believe that 
there is some continuity during theory change. The eliminativist, on the other hand,
17 Churchland, in fact thinks that given his account we do not need relations which are as strong as 
identity statements, we only need an ordered pair of expressions to function as correspondance rules 
between the theories, so long as the second element applies (the reducing element) wherever the first 
element (the reduced element) is thought to apply.
18 Rorhlich, F. [1988] offers an account of reduction which simply ignores the problems of incompatible 
ontologies and provides an account of the formal deductions given by scientists when supposedly 
offering reductions. However, as I have said repeatedly, I am only interested in epistemological 
reductionism inasmuch as it can be shown to provide support for ontological reductionism.
19 By anti-realism here I mean the view that scientific theories are false, and in particuar the view as 
motivated by considerations of the past falsity of successful theories.
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finds a revolutionary comrade in the anti-realist: both assert that radical theory change 
marks an absolute discontinuity between one way of looking at the world and another.
The relevant question now, of course, is: what exactly is it, according to the 
realist/reductionist that remains constant during theory change? One possible solution 
is to fall back on the relatively smooth mathematical transition between theories. So 
one might argue it is not the ontological "content" of the theory that is real but the 
mathematical structure.20 But this way of tackling the problem suffers from the same 
difficulties as the positivist account of reduction. It robs the theories of ontological 
content and that is too high a price to pay for the physicalist, for physicalism without 
firm ontological commitments is no doctrine at all. Physicalism requires a 
metaphysically more robust view to provide some substance (literally) to its ontology.
I think if we reconsider the Kepler and Newton case there are some particular 
points that can be made here which might motivate us to consider it an example of 
reduction rather elimination. First, it seems difficult to deny that the central terms of 
both theories pick out the same objects. Both Kepler and Newton are talking about for 
example Mars and the orbit of Mars. So the considerations which motivated the 
incommensurability claim and semantic holism have little intuitive appeal here. 
However, the observation that some of the terms in the theories refer to the same 
objects is not sufficient to ground the claim that one theory has reduced to the other. 
The same observation could be made about Ptolemaic and Copemican astronomy and 
I take it that intuitively at least we wish to consider these older theories to be 
eliminated rather than reduced. There are more significant links between Newton’s 
and Kepler’s theories which set them apart from their predecessors. Perhaps most 
importantly, Kepler and Newton were the first astronomer-scientists to provide 
physical explanations of the movement of the planets. That is to say, both offered 
dynamical explanations of the movement of the planets around their orbits that were in
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the spirit of the non-teleological approach of the then emerging sciences. It does not 
matter that they disagreed about the magnitude or the particular nature of the force. 
What is important is that both men were looking for the same type of explanation. This 
put them at odds with both Copernicus and his Ptolemaic predecessors. All of their 
explanations, in as much as they offered any reason for the planets following the 
particular paths they did, required new and extraneous metaphysical notions - turning 
crystal spheres and the like. Indeed, I think it is fair to speculate that the reason 
pre-Keplerian astronomy worked so comfortably with untidy epicycles is because it 
had sacrificed dynamical explanation for the greater metaphysical or theological 
virtues of explanation in terms of perfect circles. There is, it appears, some sense in 
which methodologically, and in their judgement of what counted as good explanations 
Newton and Kepler were as one.
Perhaps the foregoing considerations, in addition with the derivation from within 
Newtonian mechanics of something like Kepler’s laws might persuade us that the 
Kepler-Newton case is an example of theoretical reduction as opposed to elimination. 
But we have no clear-cut way of making that judgement, only some vague 
motivations. I have no doubt one could make similar pleas for almost any theoretical 
change in the history of science. Perhaps we can consider Ptolemaic astronomy to 
reduce to Newtonian mechanics, if we sympathetically interpret the key terms. That is 
to say, we might take the turning of crystal spheres to refer obliquely to the 
gravitational force of attraction between the two bodies. Moreover, we can achieve 
something like a derivation of the Ptolemaic theory from Newtonian mechanics, since, 
the relative positions of the planets from the perspective of the Earth may be derived 
from Newtonian mechanics and these will approximate the predictions of Ptolemy.21
20 See Worrall, J. “Structural Realism: The best of Both Worlds” in Papineau (ed.) [1996]
21 Such a model of reduction would be dangerously close to the positivist model discussed first. But this 
seems an almost inevitable consequence of accepting that the reduced theory and the theory derived 
from the reducing theory are different. What is their ultimate mark of similarity? Surely, nothing more 
than they make broadly similar predictions for the outcome of events.
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One’s intuitions may rebel against such a course but there does not seem to be an 
adequate way to analyse what the difference is between the two cases.
However one feels ultimately about the Newton-Kepler case, a number of 
lessons should be drawn from this case study. First, a naive reductionism seems 
untenable, even in the best-case scenarios. A certain amount of conceptual change is 
inevitably involved in any theory shift. Once we accept this and move from a naive to 
a more sophisticated view, it becomes difficult to say why any case is a reduction 
rather than an elimination. One is forced to invoke, as I have done, the vague and the 
platitudinous: congruent ontological themes within the two theories and the derivation 
of mathematically similar structures. Churchland himself acknowledges as much -  the 
reasons he offers for considering a theory to be reduced, rather than eliminated are 
largely pragmatic, involving considerations of “entrenchment, convenience and 
continuity”22. But these are judgements which will vary from individual to individual. 
Until such difficulties are sorted out no detailed analysis of reduction is likely to be 
forthcoming; so we are left with platitudes and personal judgements.
It may be felt that the above discussion is irrelevant to the real issue of 
reduction. What has been addressed by the accounts of Nagel and Churchland is best 
characterised not as a reduction of one theory to another but straightforwardly as 
theoretical replacement. Since I have drawn a parallel between scientific realists’ 
concern for theory change and worries about differentiating reductions from 
eliminations, I am obviously not convinced there is any such distinction. Nevertheless, 
I am willing to entertain the thought for the present. What sorts of theoretical relations 
would be real reductions and how would they differ from the Kepler-Newton 
example? Several possibilities suggest themselves. First of all, one might simply 
believe that reductions involve explanations of larger things in terms of smaller things 
and the Kepler-Newton case does not appear to be an example of that sort. Such a
17
position, though, can have no force unless it entails some categorical difference 
between the relation of microscopic to macroscopic theories and the example I have 
discussed. I can see no obvious reason to expect such a difference.
A superficially more persuasive reason for classifying the Kepler-Newton case 
as theory change might be because it involves a diachronic subsumption of one theory 
by another whereas reductions, so the thought might go, must be synchronic. Again, I 
do not think this is a helpful distinction. As the history of science testifies to very often 
the sorts of development that are considered reductions only occur after there has been 
some change in the discipline from which the reducing theory emerges.
Perhaps one way of understanding the relation between reduced and reducing 
theory which might introduce fewer problems for a reduction is to view the reduced 
theory as classificatory, rather than theoretically encumbered. By a classificatory 
science I simply mean one which picks out and groups together objects which are 
considered similar in some way. Such a view would appear to circumvent the 
problems of incommensurability since a classificatory scheme does not appear to have 
ontological or theoretical commitments beyond the entities that it classifies. In the next 
section I shall discuss the possibility of regarding chemistry as reduced to physics in 
this way.
The Reduction of Chemistry to Physics
Neither chemistry nor physics is a simple unified theory like Newtonian 
mechanics. Physics is made up of at least three sub-disciplines -  quantum physics, 
statistical mechanics, and relativity theory, none of which reduce, as yet, to the others 
and, in fact, appear to contradict each other on various key points. For example, the 
determinism implied by relativity is at odds with the indeterminism implicit in both 
quantum and statistical mechanics; and one could make similar points about the 
various fields of chemistry. So first we must be clear about which theory is being
22 Churland, P.S. [1986]
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reduced to which. In keeping with the suggestion that we view chemistry as a 
classificatory science, I suggest we take the supposed reduction of chemistry to 
physics to be understood as the physical explanation of the periodic table. I do not 
think this is a fair representation of the discipline of chemistry but pursuing the matter 
in this way will be enlightening; and should demonstrate the limitations of a particular 
view of science espoused by certain philosophers, notably Quine23 and Peirce24. That 
is, science proceeds by first grouping objects together into kinds and then providing 
explanations of these taxonomies in terms of some fundamental theory.25
Roughly speaking one can explain the structure of the periodic table as 
follows: the Pauli exclusion principle states that no two fermions, can have the same 
quantum numbers and same position at the same time. Electrons are fermions; it 
therefore follows that the electrons are constrained to group in certain characteristic 
shell formations. In broad terms, each new shell marks a new period or row of the 
table and those elements with the same number of electrons in their outer shells fall 
into the same columns. It is this latter fact which is taken to explain the similar 
chemical properties of elements in the same column.26 We can also unproblematically 
assert identity statements between the physical constituents and the atoms. Each 
element is made of up of protons and neutrons, the number of protons determines 
which element is which. Obviously, any science that is classificatory is clearly more 
amenable to a "smooth" reduction; one simply provides a causal explanation for the 
phenomenologically contrived arrangement and identity statements to link the non­
physical entities to their physical constituents. Indeed, there is little room here for
23 Quine, W.V.O. [1969]
24 Peirce, C.S. [1932]
25 This may seem redolent of Rutherford’s oft quoted remark that “there is physics and there is stamp 
collecting”.
26 Of course, it is not quite as straightforward as this; the way the electrons fill each shell is not linear 
process. It is often energetically favourable to move up to a larger shell, before a lower one is full. 
These nuances though can be demonstrated and in actual fact have little to do with the final placings of 
the elements.
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disagreement between reductionists and eliminativists, since there seems nothing to 
eliminate.
This is all very well as far it goes but even classificatory schemes are committed 
to at least one piece of ontology; namely, the elements they classify. A complete 
reduction of the classificatory scheme must be able to account for the origins of those 
things that it classifies. We need to explain how it is these physical elements have 
come together to make up the chemical elements they do. Now, there is, of course, a 
cosmological account of the origin of the chemical domain but by accepting it we then 
have moved from a simple reduction of one theory to another to something quite 
different. The explanation offered at the cosmological level introduces concepts 
entirely foreign to quantum theory. That is, we are told that the elements are formed in 
the nuclear reactions of stars and disseminated throughout the universe in supernova 
explosions. And that explanation introduces a time-orientated evolution into the 
universe, something that is not found in the temporally symmetric equations of 
quantum mechanics. Moreover, in order to understand the nuclear reactions a new 
force must be introduced, the strong nuclear force, which only operates at very short 
distances. But this new force is strange: it only functions, in nature, if the gravitational 
force between protons (and neutrons) can overcome the stronger electrostatic 
repulsion. Hence, the explanation of chemical formations seems to depend upon a pre- 
established harmony between gravity, the strong force and the initial conditions of the 
universe.27 The last of these conditions we are forced to admit because if the initial 
conditions of the universe were slightly different, so the story goes, then the universe 
would either have expanded too quickly for star clusters to form or collapsed back to a 
singularity almost immediately. If one had a theory of everything which linked the 
various forces of nature (and demonstrated they were in fact one, as superstring theory 
attempts to do) then the apparent collusion of the forces of nature (understood now not
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as separate forces but as just different aspects of the only force) would be less 
worrying. But that, and superstring theory with it, is mere speculation. As it stands 
there is no straightforward reduction of one theory to another here because there is no 
single account which explains both the properties of the elements and their emergence.
I may, at this juncture, be accused of missing the point or at least not thinking 
the case through properly. Just because there is no complete reduction of the periodic 
table to quantum mechanics, does not mean there is not a reduction to physics. After 
all, it was I who made the claim that the reduction was to quantum theory. But most 
people who talk of a reduction of chemistry only talk of physics in general. Any 
person defending such a view would have to be surprisingly sanguine about the 
apparent collusion between the forces of nature that our current account of chemical 
formation suggests. However, in another sense, they would be making my point for 
me. It is precisely because physics in general is not a unified discipline with logically 
consistent theories that makes the notion of reduction in principle to physics so 
problematic. In short, because physics itself is not actually reducible to any one of its 
elements there is little hope that any other discipline will be so reducible. The 
reductionist will no doubt hold out for some new complete theory of the universe, 
something like superstring theory appears to offer. But even assuming such a theory 
exists, and that is a major assumption28, then the problems I outlined in the Kepler- 
Newton case will resurface. What relation will this new theory bear to the extant 
elements of physics? How much conceptual change will be involved in 
accommodating the differing ontologies of the current theories? If an argument for 
physicalism is to be based on such considerations of an ideal theory, then these 
problems need to be addressed. I shall return to this point in later sections.29
27 These points are developed in greater detail in Popper, [1982].
28 In fact granting this assumption would be to grant that physicalism is true and of course that is the 
point very much at issue.
See the beginning of section ID in particular for the suggestion that technical results in quantum 
theory may provide clues to the sorts of future theory we might expect.
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The argument thus far has focused on demonstrating the conceptual problems of 
what appear like favourable reductions, either because of problems in defining what 
reduction is or because the reduction appears to involve overlapping and mutually 
inconsistent components from different aspects of some discipline. I now wish to 
argue in a more straightforward way that chemistry, understood more broadly now as a 
theoretical discipline, does not reduce to physics; and perhaps more, importantly, we 
should not hold out hope that chemistry will ever reduce.
Problems of Complexity 
For certain systems, for example the n-body problem in classical mechanics, 
there is no closed algorithmic solution to their dynamical equations. So given the 
appropriate equations of motion and the initial conditions of the system one cannot, in 
one operation, leap from knowledge of the system now straight to knowledge of the 
state of the system at any arbitrary time in the future. In order to calculate the position 
of any one of the particles a series solution must be used. This fact in and of itself does 
not threaten the integrity of the prediction. After all, a calculation that takes many 
operations is as much a calculation as one that can be done in one step. However, for 
any real problem there will be some error in the measurement of the initial conditions. 
Human beings are, I take it, incapable of obtaining absolute accuracy, particularly 
since it is possible that accuracy of measurement may require irrational numbers. 
Given then some system which is complex enough (that is chaotic, in the technical 
sense of the word) the error in the initial conditions will increase exponentially with 
time (that is, with each step in the calculation). Hence, using such methods only very 
short-term predictions will be possible. Indeed, for certain very strange systems there 
may, in fact, be no appropriate series expansion of the solution; hence, not even short­
term predictions can be made.30
30 See Suppes, P. [1984] Ch. 7 for a more detailed discussion of then-body problem. See also Hall, N. 
(ed.) [1993] for a discussion of some of the applications and implications of chaos theory.
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Such considerations seriously undermine any strong reading of reductionism. 
For even if we grant there is some ideal-physics and we have knowledge of it, it will 
not follow that we will be able to predict or explain all phenomena in terms of that 
theory, as it will simply be far too complicated. But we can in fact argue the other way 
as well. Because we cannot predict or explain complicated phenomena with physics in 
practice, we do know that the phenomena which they describe fall under physical laws. 
Take chemistry as an example: given the complexity of certain calculations it is 
impossible to obtain answers from physics for certain chaotic systems. Chemistry then 
as a matter of necessity has to develop alternative ways of understanding the world. 
But how do we know these alternative ways of looking at the world are consistent with 
physics, how do we know they are consistent with physicalism? The simple truth is we 
do not and we can not.
The Limits of Reductionist Explanation
Apart from this technical worry about our ability to carry through reductions, 
there are also cases where we appear to have what looks like a reduction but may for 
other reasons be quite unsatisfactory. Consider again chemistry. It is possible by 
numerical methods to grind out results for certain reactions. Results that will 
accurately inform us of the quantitative measures of everything. For example, we can 
calculate the bonding energy of some molecule (provided it is not too complicated) by 
approximate, numerical methods. Now, that sort of achievement might be considered, 
under a liberal-interpretation, a reduction of some sort. It seems to display what Peter 
Smith31 calls explanatory “inter-facing” between two theories; that is to say, a certain 
chemical fact is explained by physical and numerical methods. However, as an 
explanation of chemical bonding it will leave many qualitative questions unanswered, 
not least what the chemical bond actually is. To quote a practising theoretical chemist: 
“Brute force numerical quantum chemistry can hardly do justice to the qualitative
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features of chemistry. But without insight into the qualitative concepts we are losing 
chemistry. The allegedly basic methods often fail to illuminate the essential function 
of a molecule or a reaction which is evident to an experimentalist.”32 So even once 
physics has told us everything that it can in quantitative terms, there appears to be in 
the case of chemistry at least some qualitative residue still to be explained, and still to 
be understood if the discipline is to be practised at all. Reductionists might respond in 
two ways. Liberals like Smith might claim this “inter-facing” is enough to support a 
modest reductionist programme. But that is really to ignore the question of interest; 
namely that the explanation in terms of physics leave important questions unanswered 
and fails to elucidate what appears obvious to the chemist. Philosophers with more 
conservative reductionist leanings might wish to turn eliminative. Notably Quine33, 
has been tempted to deny that there is any place in a finished science for qualitative 
considerations; all the meaningful questions can and will be answered by purely 
quantitative means. Surely, though, there is something wrong if a philosopher starts 
telling a scientist which questions are and which are not relevant, particularly if that 
philosopher considers himself a naturalist. So reductions as well as not being 
practically feasible in certain situations may also be unenlightening.
Such considerations also highlight the inadequacy of reductionism as a global 
methodological principle. The standard assumption, in both science and philosophy, is 
that by pursuing reductions light will be shed on the reduced elements, either by 
demonstrating that we may get by with fewer elements in our ontology or showing us 
of what the reduced elements really consist. But as the above example illustrates 
reductions do not always provide adequate explanations.34
31 Smith, P. “Modest Reductions and the Unity of Science” in Charles and Lennon (eds.) [1992]
32 Primas, H. [1983], p.8
33 Quine, W.V.O [1969]
34 This is, I suppose, similar to John Dupre’s [1993] remark that reductions tell us how things are but not 
what they are. (Perhaps this might be better put in the example I briefly discuss as follows: redeuctions 
tell us how much for certain interactions but not what for.)
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Some qualification is required here. I do not wish to deny there have been many
dramatic revolutions in the sciences brought about by reductionist programmes.
Bohr’s reductionist urge to explain hydrogen and various chemical phenomena
precipitated the quantum revolution; but as we have seen that revolution did not result
in a complete reduction of chemistry to quantum theory. Similarly the breakthroughs
in molecular biology promised much in the way of reduction of biology to chemistry
but again this has not been completed. Reductionism, as a methodological principle,
has certainly led to great scientific successes but I would argue very few, if any, actual
reductions. Nevertheless, the relative failure of most reductionist problems may not
concern some. They might argue that the very fact reductionism is used as a
methodological principle and is, in fact, partially successful demonstrates the validity
of reductionist thinking. Or to put it differently, scientists who assume reductionism
holds true are more successful; and this must give some support to the idea that
reductionists are on the right lines. It is unclear what force such an argument has.
Clearly, useful methodological assumptions may actually be false. It may, for
example, be better in some methodologies to search for deterministic explanations, in
the sense that a deterministic explanation seems more complete than an indeterministic
explanation. Similarly one might think reductionist explanations render non-physical
phenomena understandable, in a way which anti-reductionism obscures. But in either
case that should not lead us to the conclusion that the world is either deterministic or
that non-physical theories must reduce to physical theories. We may seek and we may
not find as for example, 19th century physicists, did when they attempted to reduce
electromagnetic phenomena to mechanics. The main problem with a methodological
argument for reductionism, though, is that there does not appear to be a unified notion
within reductionist programmes of the sort of theory one should be attempting to
reduce others to. Perhaps some scientists try to reduce chemistry to quantum
mechanics; biologists might attempt to explain the inheritance of phenotypic
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characteristics in terms of some genetic theory; psychologists may hope to reduce 
elements of their study to neuroscience. Reductionism as a philosophical position 
maintains that one (and only one) consistent theory of the world is required to account 
for everything. But reductions in science diverge, for sensible practical reasons, about 
which theory is considered fundamental. The tendency, one may think, is always 
towards physics but as before, it is not clear to what part of physics everything must be 
reduced; or any existing discipline comes anywhere near this ideal.
The partial success of reductions does I think support reductionism as a 
methodological principle, in some sense; not as a global principle, applicable in a 
uniform way to all cases, but rather as a local principle. The sorts of theories for which 
reductionist research bears fruit generally cover broadly the same phenomena, like 
Newton’s and Kepler’s theories, and even then it must be admitted that the reduction 
is unlikely to be completely successful. The grandiose pretensions of epistemological 
reductionism or the unity of science programme, which hopes to explain everything in 
terms of one theory, are just not supported by science or its methodological practices.
Phvsicalism without Reduction?
The arguments I have put forward in this section have been many and varied.
The reductionist faces many problems. First, there is no satisfactory model of theory
reduction that applies even to some of the more favourable cases of putative reduction
from the history of science. Second we have seen that even when we consider
reductions in a more charitable way as providing a rough and ready explanation of
other non-physical phenomena, we have reason to think that it will not be possible to
carry through the actual reductions because of problems of complexity. And even
when something like a reduction is carried through many questions are left
unanswered either of a qualitative nature or in terms of explaining how different and
apparently contradictory theories conspire to account for the phenomena. We have
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even seen good reason to doubt the usefulness of reductionism as a global 
methodological principle.
Such considerations will not disturb some who are committed to physicalism. In 
fact, they may be able to use my examples to their own ends, reconciling the obvious 
lack of unity within contemporary science with their own favoured ontology. Chaos 
theory, so they could argue, shows the practical limitations of the unity of science 
programme; and the lack of informativeness of physical explanations demonstrates the 
need to introduce different levels and types of explanation. However, neither of these 
considerations threatens the possibility that there does in fact exist some theory, 
obviously unknown as yet, which in principle explains everything. Certainly I do not 
wish to deny this possibility but we should bear in mind that it is no more than a 
possibility. The actual state of science, even the discipline of physics itself is neatly 
summed up by Ian Hacking when he says: “Every single year since 1840 physics alone 
has used more (incompatible) models of phenomena in its day to day business, than it 
used in the preceding year.”35 Science is disunited and looks more and more disunited 
as it continues to develop. To hope that it might really, in principle, be otherwise, is I 
suggest to hope in vain.
Some physicalists might agree with this statement. They may be tempted to 
claim that non-reductive physicalism is consistent with the denial of reduction in 
principle. I shall argue in the following section that this cannot be the case. There is no 
coherent non-reductive physicalist position that is not committed to reduction in 
principle. The best a non-reductionist can hope for is to explain why we should not 
expect reductions in practice.
35 Hacking, I[1983] p.218
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PHYSICALISM AND REDUCTION IN PRINCIPLE
The prevailing orthodoxy within the physicalist community is non-reductive 
physicalism: a position which attempts to reconcile the claim that there are 
autonomous special sciences with a metaphysical commitment to physicalism. Such 
philosophers appeal either to the idea of multiple-realisability or that of supervenience 
to justify this claim. I shall argue in this section that there is no coherent position that 
can be classed as both physicalist and ontologically non-reductive. And, moreover, 
that the standard appeals to supervenience and multiple-realisablility either lead to 
reductionism in principle or are not strong enough to guarantee a physicalist ontology. 
The discussion will move from the respectable earthly study of actual scientific 
theories undertaken in the last section to the oxygen-starved high planes of 
metaphysical speculation. In other words, we shall entertain theories which are 
entirely speculative concerning the relation between the physical and the non­
physical. I shall concentrate mainly on the relation between physics and the special 
sciences of biology and psychology since these are the sciences most discussed in the 
literature. However, if we grant that these hypothesised relations hold, then the 
general points could equally well apply to any of the special sciences.
There are, I take it, three claims made by non-reductive physicalists that are 
constitutive of their position:
1) It is a form of physicalism. That is, it is committed to some view that places 
physics or some idealised notion of physics in a special position in the ontology.
2) It is non-reductive. That is, first it admits into its ontology properties, events, facts 
or something similar which are non-physical and second at least some parts of the 
ontology cannot be reduced to physics.
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3) Finally, non-reductive materialists are not eliminativists. That is to say, the fact 
that events, properties or whatever of non-physical disciplines do not reduce, does 
not mean they are not fully real properties.
Some clarification of the first two points is required: what do the terms 
“physicalism” and “reduction” mean in this context? Thus far I have only shown that 
reductions to actual physics will not be forthcoming. Given non-reductivists accept 
this we need another way to characterise physicalism that does not presuppose 
reductionism. Since I am following Jaegwon Kim1 in many of the arguments I 
present, and he is a self-professed physicalist I will utilise his conception of the 
position. A physicalist, according to Kim, is at least committed to the completeness 
of physics. Commitment to the completeness of physics (CP) is a necessary condition 
for physicalism. This condition might be thought to be far from illuminating. It 
appears we have simply shifted the problem of defining physicalism to one of 
defining what constitutes physics. I shall discuss this topic at greater in the length in 
the next section of the thesis but some general remarks need to be made here to clarify 
the ensuing discussion. It is clear, I think, that the completeness of physics implies 
that physics is a uniform discipline, a single idealised theory which, in principle, 
explains the occurrence of all physical events. As I argued in the previous section 
extant physics does not match up to this ideal. Therefore, the physicalist must have 
some extension and/or revision of current physics in mind. I shall call this “future- 
physics” to distinguish it from the actual subject physics that one may obtain degrees 
in and is written about in scientific journals. Various constraints though must be 
placed on the nature of the extension of physics to “future-physics” or (CP) will end
1 Kim, J. [1989,1992,1996]
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up trivially true. If we place no parameters on the sorts of properties or laws which 
can or cannot count as physical, then the physicalist is free to claim any property 
indispensably required to explain some event is part of “future-physics”. For instance, 
if it turns out that psychological properties are essential to account for certain 
phenomena, then the physicalist might simply claim that those properties are really 
physical (part of the true, complete “future-physics”). So understood “future-physics” 
will be complete by definition.2 The problem of prescribing the limits of “future- 
physics” shall not exercise me greatly here, since I will be concerned mainly with the 
relation between “future-physics” and mental or psychological properties as discussed 
in the literature on the mind-body problem. I will take it then for the time being that 
no psychological property, state, etc. can be part of our basic “future-physics”.3 A 
condition which amounts to the surely indisputable claim that whatever physicalism 
turns out to be, it should not be a version of Cartesian dualism. Hence, we shall 
assume at the very least that mental properties will have to be accounted for in some 
special way.
Reduction is somewhat easier to define since I have discussed it at length in 
the previous section. We may work here with the strong Causey-model of reduction. 
That is, reduction involves the deducing of one theory from another using identity 
statements to bridge gaps in the vocabulary of the two theories. This might be thought 
to be at odds with my assertion that we have no good model of reduction. However, it 
is not. I claimed in the previous section that the Causey-model did not appear to apply 
to any actual cases of reduction; if it did we would have clear cases of reduction. I 
shall argue that the sort of relations non-reductive physicalists maintain exist between
2 That physicalism is threatened by triviality in this sense is argued by Tim Crane and D.H. Mellor
, this is the understanding of the completeness of physics put forward by Papineau [1993] 
which he thinks gives the doctrine content.
[1990].
In essence
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the physical and the non-physical are in fact strong enough to support Causey 
reduction
Arguments from Multiple-realisation
Jerry Fodor4 and Hilary Putnam5 both noted that certain properties, in 
particular computational or psychological properties, could be realised or 
implemented, if you prefer, by a variety of different physical systems. For example, 
an electronic, mechanical, hydraulic, or (arguably) a biological computer may 
implement a simple arithmetical calculation. But since none of these computational 
devices has anything physical in common, it would be wrong to identify these 
computational states with any of their physical bases. It follows then, so advocates of 
multiple-realisability have argued, that since there is no one-to-one correlation 
between physical states and these higher states there can be no bridge laws (or identity 
statements) connecting the terms of the two theories; and thus there will be no 
reduction.
There are two levels of response to this argument both of which are found in 
Kim’s writings. First one may question how deep multiple-realisability is supposed to 
go. Let us suppose that non-reductive materialists believe pain is a multiply realised 
phenomenon. Now, does that mean that pain has a different physical base for different 
species or does it mean even within the same species or same creature these 
characteristics would be multiply realised? If one prefers the first of these options, 
then it follows that although a pain-state in me would be physically different from, say 
a pain-state in an octopus, one would expect it to be physically similar to a pain-state 
in another human. If this is the case then there appears no bar to a more local sort of 
reduction. The appropriate bridge laws would then be of the form: pain-in-human =
4 Fodor, J. [1974]
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physical state X; and pain-in-octopus = physical state Y. Employing such bridge 
principles, one could then derive the psychological laws or states associated with 
human-pains from the physics of the human body. One might feel that these sorts of 
local reductions are in some way unsatisfactory and properties, laws or whatever 
should reduce across the board. However, some of the examples of reductions we find 
from the history of science are actually local reductions of this form. Take, for 
example, the supposed reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, the 
favoured example of a reduction for most philosophers. That reduction involves the 
following bridge law: temperature = mean molecular kinetic energy. Temperature 
itself, though, is a multiple-realised phenomenon. We may talk of the temperature of a 
gas, a liquid, a solid or even of the background radiation of the universe. But the 
bridge law only applies to gaseous states and hence only a local reduction of the 
property temperature is effected (which is not necessarily to say that thermodynamics 
is not reduced, only that it employs this specific notion of the term temperature). So, 
in principle, local reductions look likely given multiple-realisation relations.
Perhaps the advocate of multiple-realisation will prefer the more radical option 
of denying even local correlations between physical states and realised properties. Of 
course, this is a possibility; it may be the case that the realisation bases for pain 
properties are entirely heterogeneous. But the situation described becomes quite 
curious. Why do all these very different bases all realise the same property? The non- 
reductive physicalist owes us some account of how non-physical properties could 
have such utterly heterogeneous bases. Yet even if we do allow that such 
heterogeneity is possible, there is a fairly obvious response open to someone like Kim 
who opposes the idea of non-reductive materialism. He need simply maintain that the
5 Putnam, H. [1965]
32
disjunction of all physical states that realise the non-physical property can function as 
a bridge law. So we may deploy the following bridge law: M = PI v P2 v P3 v ... and 
use it in a Nagel-style reduction of say the mental to the physical.
Some non-reductive physicalists have tried to rule such a move out. Fodor, for 
one, has claimed that disjunctive properties like the above are not natural kinds and 
only bridge laws which cite connections between such kinds are to count in 
reductions. Presumably then Fodor would deny that the identity statement as I have 
written it above holds true. But this all seems very mysterious, since after all the 
disjunction is coextensive with mental property. In fact it is coextensive with M in all 
worlds where the laws of physics hold. Why is that not sufficient to allow one to 
assert the identity statement? It simply begs the question to say that M is a kind and 
the disjunction is not and therefore the identity statement does not hold; for we want 
to know why M is a kind, what is it that it has that the disjunction has not. I cannot 
conceive of any way to make sense of this claim which would not imply that M is 
something over and above the realisation relation; that for example all the P states 
caused M, where M is now considered something different from the realisation bases. 
But no self-respecting physicalist is likely to endorse such a view; it would be 
inimical to their physicalism. It would imply there was more to the world 
(metaphysically speaking) than that described by physics, which is to reject to 
physicalism.
Asserting that disjunctions are not kinds cannot threaten the validity of the 
identity statement; it can only lead to the conclusion that if the disjunction is not a 
kind, then neither is the non-physical property, M. If the special science properties 
are not genuine kinds then that would imply that the laws cited by these sciences will 
not be genuine laws. So any special science which has multiply realised properties
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will not be a proper science. In short, to accept the disjunction as a real property, and 
therefore a genuine natural kind is to embrace reductionism about the non-physical 
properties and the theories in which they feature. To go the other way and reject that 
the disjunction is a real property and a natural kind would appear to point towards 
eliminativism concerning the theories in which it features (or possibly towards local 
reductions of the kind described above). It does not matter to me at the moment which 
particular option any physicalist might favour, it might vary from case to case. What 
is important to realise here is that there is no non-reductive, non-eliminative position 
in between. One cannot assert the realisation relations between the physical and the 
non-physical and then claim there is some sort of asymmetry between the properties 
cited on either side of the relation, that one is a kind and the other is not, for example. 
If one is a kind, both are; if one is not, neither is.6
The general point holds no matter how pathological one imagines the 
realisation bases to be. It has been argued for example that we could imagine that the 
disjunction of physical properties to be infinitely long and non-recursively 
specifiable.7 If that were the case it would be impossible for any being with finite 
cognitive capacities, which I take it is the category of being most of us fall into, to 
derive one theory from the other. This is undoubtedly correct but such pathological 
bases only place a pragmatic or epistemic constraint on the reduction. If such 
realisation relations do actually exist then, in principle reductions should take place, 
even if no human could actually demonstrate the reduction held. Some philosophers, 
of course, wish only to defend non-reductive materialism as an epistemic doctrine and
6 Kim elsewhere seems to favour the idea that disjunctive properties are not kinds because they, like 
that other disjunctive property grue, are not projectible. That is to say, they will not be suitable for the 
use in reliable inductions. One may summarise the position like this: given appropriate data on non­
physical property, M, realised by base P, that will give us no right to expect reliable inductions 
concerning property M when it is realised by property Q.
7 Heilman and Thompson [1975]
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multiple-realisation may provide some support for that idea.8 Or at least it provides a 
way of understanding how you might be both a non-reductionist in practice but have 
reductionist beliefs in principle. Why anyone should be so philosophically two-faced 
with respect to his or her ontological and epistemological perspectives is of course a 
different matter. Let us now turn to the supervenience doctrines to see if they are 
better equipped to support non-reductive physicalism.
Supervenience
Supervenience came to prominence in the philosophy of mind with Donald 
Davidson’s paper “Anomalous Monism”. However, Davidson’s writings did not 
develop the idea of supervenient properties much beyond the slogan that there can be 
“no change in the mental, without a change in the physical”. Other philosophers, 
notably Kim took the task of providing a precise definition of supervenience much 
more seriously. That work has led to many permutations of the basic idea, but each of 
these can be grouped into three main categories. If we take M and P to be non-empty 
families of properties to which F and G belong respectively, then we may define the 
three relations as follows:
(SS) Strong Supervenience M strongly supervenes on P just in case necessarily for 
any object x and any property F in M, if x has F, then there exists a property G in P 
such that x has G, and necessarily if anyy has G, it has F.
(WS) Weak supervenience M weakly supervenes on P just in case necessarily for 
any object x and any property F in M, if x has F, then there exits a property G in P 
such that x has G, and if any y  has G, it has F.
8 For example Bonevac, D. “Reduction in the Mind of God” in Savellos and Yalgin (ed.) [1995]
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(GS) Global Supervenience M globally supervenes on P just in case for any two 
worlds, wl and w2, if they are P-property indistinguishable, then they are M-property 
indistinguishable.9
To put that in English: if the mental strongly supervenes on the physical then 
wherever there are certain physical properties there will be certain mental properties 
and that relation holds counterfactually. (WS) is identical, except the relation does not 
hold counterfactually. (GS) simply implies that given the complete physical state of 
the universe, the complete mental state of the universe is fixed. I think it should be 
clear from these definitions that (SS) implies both (WS) and (GS).
The definitions I have provided are not usually thought to be sufficient to 
guarantee the sort of dependency relation between the physical and non-physical most 
physicalists seek. That is because a dependency relation is presumably asymmetric, if 
A depends upon B, it cannot be the case that B depends on A. However, none of the 
supervenience relations defined above are, as they stand, asymmetric. (For this reason 
supervenience relations are sometimes referred to as co-variance, as opposed to 
dependency, relations.) Consequently, philosophers who advocate supervenience as a 
way of understanding the relation between the physical and the non-physical normally 
wish to add extra conditions to ensure asymmetry. Supervenience plus these 
additional conditions then is thought to give support to non-reductive physicalism 
because it is a relation at once strong enough to support physicalism, yet weak enough 
to block reduction; that is the idea, at least.
9 Different philosophers will defend subtly different variations of these relations depending upon on 
how they construe the modal terms in these definitions and depending on whether they think the 
supervenience relation holds for objects or events.
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It will be my contention in the rest of this section that none of the 
supervenience relations outlined above will be adequate to support non-reductive 
physicalism. I shall look at each briefly in turn and then examine a more complicated 
supervenience argument based on considerations from biology. I think, this biological 
variation on the supervenience argument goes further than other positions in making 
non-reductive physicalism a credible epistemological position but it too falls short of 
an ontological position worthy of that name.
Let us start with global supervenience for it is the most obviously flawed of 
the three. Assume that mental properties globally supervene on physical properties. 
Now, imagine two worlds which are physically identical and hence, by (GS), mentally 
identical. Let us suppose there is some minor change in physical properties in one of 
the worlds: that for example, a few hydrogen atoms are shifted in a galaxy far, far 
away. The two worlds now differ physically. Hence, it is perfectly consistent with 
(GS) that the two worlds may differ radically now in the distribution of their mental 
properties (or that there may be no mental properties at all in one of the worlds). It 
seems utterly mysterious then what the relation between physical and mental 
properties is, or why one should believe that the mental is actually dependent upon the 
physical.10
Advocates of (GS) will not be so easily persuaded. For example, John Post11 
argues that although global supervenience is consistent with the sort of story told 
above, it does not imply its truth. It may well be that moving a few hydrogen atoms 
has no affect at all on the mental properties of the universe. Post suggests then that 
(GS) be understood as programmatic. It defines the minimum structure which 
physicalism has to satisfy, the detail of which will be filled in later. But what will this
10 This is the standard argument given against global supervenience, first made by Kim[1989]
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additional detail consist in? Presumably it will involve citing particular physical bases 
upon which particular mental states supervene. In other words, it will involve setting 
out the sorts of relations that characterise the (SS) relation. I do not see anyway of 
defending (GS) as providing an explanation for the link between the mental and the 
physical that does not make it into a version of (SS).
Weak and strong supervenience look more promising alternatives. They are 
clearly explanatorily more robust forms of the supervenience relation because they tie 
the supervenient property more closely to the physical manifestation of the thing we 
take to have that property. That is, if the mental supervenes on the physical it 
supervenes on the sort of physical thing that has mental properties, i.e. human 
bodies.12 Yet both (WS) and (SS) imply the existence of psychophysical laws. From
the above formulations (WS) implies Gx-^Fx and (SS) implies GxlH->Fx. (WS)
though is consistent with reading the correlation between the subvenient and the 
supervenient as merely accidental; and most philosophers I suppose would think that 
accidental covariance of properties is not a strong enough relation to ground a 
dependency relation. Certainly, I take this to be Kim’s view. Hence, the only relation 
robust enough to ground dependency is (SS) which implies the existence of 
nomologically necessary connections between Fx and Gx.
11 Post, J. “Global Supervenience: Too Permissive” in Savellos and Yalgin [1995]
12 One of course might not believe that all mental properties supervene simply on what’s in the head. 
Arguments for so-called “broad content” may lead a philosopher to believe that parts of a thinker’s 
environment form some of the supervenience base. Such a view if accepted will not undermine any of 
the following arguments.
Also one should note I think that Post is scared off by (SS) because he takes it to imply individualism, 
that is narrow content. This is obviously not the case, even if historically advocates of (SS) have also 
been believers in narrow content The relevant physical base may be a relation between the thinker and 
some section of his environment. What Horgan [1993] calls regional supervenience would be a version 
of this doctrine.
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Kim’s Argument
Kim in his original paper suggests13 that the existence of such laws should lead 
us to expect reductions. It is, though, quite interesting to follow through the steps of 
Kim’s argument to see how his own analysis leads to a rather surprising result.
Presumably the idea is that given (SS) we may use laws of the form cited 
above as our bridge laws in Nagel-style reductions, either singly to yield local 
reductions or jointly (and disjunctively) to provide us with a global reduction of some 
special science discipline to physics. However, I think it pays to look more closely at 
the sort of relation between the mental and the physical implied by the (SS) relation. 
One can best appreciate this with the following diagram:
M M’
A ▲
P -----------------------------► P’
Here we take the horizontal arrow to indicate causation and the vertical arrows the 
dependency relation that is in part given by the supervenience relation (SS). It seems 
to be perfectly consistent with this picture that we imagine the M’s to be of an entirely 
different type of property. In other words, we may imagine the diagram represents the 
relations for a form of dualistic epiphenomenalism, rather than a form of physicalism. 
Indeed, it seems that is exactly what it does represent if we suppose that the mental 
property is not identical to a physical property. Kim, though, places an extra condition
13 Kim [1989]
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on a property being real which would seem to rule out construing the supervenience 
relation as at once dualistic and also epiphenomenalist. He claims that in order for any 
natural property to be construed realistically it should do some causal work. Since, by 
construction, one would think epiphenomenal mental properties do no causal work, 
they must be ruled out as real by this strengthening condition. But Kim’s own analysis 
of what makes higher-level states causally efficacious is revealing. He maintains that 
one can claim that some mental event caused some physical event if the mental event 
in question strongly supervenes on the physical base which would feature in a 
complete physical explanation of the cause of the physical event. In terms of the 
diagram above, we could say then that M caused P* for example on the Kim model. A 
direct diagonal causal arrow from M to P* is ruled out because if M causes P* directly 
that would violate the completeness of physics; or if it does not then it would at least 
mean P* was causally overdetermined which Kim thinks is unacceptable. So the above 
diagram is an acceptable form of supervenient causation. But we have yet to see any 
reason not to interpret the diagram as describing a form of dualistic 
epiphenomenalism. In fact, this seems the most natural reading. All that K im ’s 
analysis has added is the counterintuitive idea that i f  one is a dualistic 
epiphenomenalist then one can claim Kim-style that mental properties are causally 
efficaciousu  Kim still maintains, though, that the relation between the mental 
properties and the physical properties is strong enough to support reduction. So, 
according to Kim although it would appear non-reductive physicalism is not a tenable 
position, given the various constraints he has placed on the mind-body relation, what 
we might call reductive dualism is perfectly acceptable. I think this must show there is
14 The argument can probably be run with a version of psychophysical parallelism as well. However, it 
might be objected since that theory of the mind-body relation severs any connection between the two 
domains it would only be strong enough to support (WS), not (SS). (Although it is not obvious that 
must be the case.)
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something deeply wrong at the heart of Kim’s argument. It will be no surprise to find 
that I think it lies in Kim’s reliance on the Nagel-model of reduction. A stronger 
model of reduction is clearly required, one in which bridge principles are identity 
statements, to prevent such pseudo-reductions and absurd consequences.
All that said, none of the criticisms I have offered of Kim should provide the 
non-reductive physicalist with any comfort. The supervenience relation as it stands is 
not strong enough to guarantee physicalism. Moreover, the fact that 
epiphenomenalism can be construed to make the mental causally efficacious, if we 
understand it as aversion of the (SS) relation shows not that epiphenomenalist of the 
past had misunderstood their own doctrine. Rather it shows that there is a general 
problem about construing any supervenient property as causally efficacious. If the 
supervenience relation is strengthened in a way that rules out dualism, by say the use 
of property identities, it will simply be a variation of the multiple realisability thesis 
and will encounter the same problems described above.
The Aetiological Account of Functions
I wish to turn to one last variation of the supervenience and multiple- 
realisability relations, one which does not simply rest on the fact (if it is such) that the 
relations between lower and higher order properties are heterogeneous in order to 
block reduction. It is an account put forward in various forms by David Papineau,15 
Ruth Millikan, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald1617 and Ned Block18 that employs the 
theory of evolution to make sense of the multiple realisability and supervenience 
claims.
15 Papineau, D. [1993]
16 Macdonald, G., “Reduction and Evolutionary Biology” in Charles and Lennon [1992]
17 Macdonald, C., “Psychological Supervenience, Dependency and Reduction” in Savellos and Yalgin 
[1995]
18 Block, N. [1995]
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The basic idea is as follows: non-physical, in particular biological and 
psychological properties, are not reducible to physical states because although they 
are realised by these properties they are underpinned in special ways that are not 
captured by the physical bases and their relations. In the case of biology this is 
understood in terms of some functional or teleological property. A non-physical 
functional property then is explained in terms of the selective pressures which brought 
about its existence. So we may say biological property, B, has the function of doing 
A, if, and only if, B is present (that is, selected) as a result of causing A. This is 
known as the aetiological account of functions. Advocates of the theory can cash out 
the explanatory debt I claimed any physicalist owed us of why one should believe 
such properties could be so radically multiple-realised. For example, certain creatures 
may all have the functional property of rearing up in order to frighten off predators 
and that, as a matter of fact may be physically realised in a variety of ways, according 
to the advocate of the theory at least. The aetiological account provides us with a way 
of understanding how that could be; all the various biological systems (or their 
ancestors) performed that same function and as a result survived.
The thesis can be put in terms of supervenience as well. However, so 
construed it is a non-standard variant of the supervenience view. Since the functional 
property can only be understood by reference to the causal history of the biological 
entity, functional properties are taken to supervene on both the physical states of the 
creature and its ancestors. That is to say, we must understand the supervenience 
doctrines diachronically.
But it is neither the fact that such accounts imply multiple-realisability nor 
their construal as supervenience relations which makes them non-reductive. If that is 
all there was to the claim that they do not reduce at the ontological level, then there
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would be no additional interest in these forms of non-reductive physicalism; they 
would be no different from standard functionalist views. It is the additional assertion 
that a full understanding of bio-functional properties brings in teleological notions, 
goals, ends, etc.; and such teleological notions are in principle irreducible to the 
causal-nomological framework of the physical. Similarly with psychological 
properties, they will contain teleological, rational or normative elements which, so it 
is argued, prevent them being reduced to physics. As Cynthia Macdonald puts it 
“[non-reductive physicalists] will argue that intentional properties have a nature, due 
to their possession of intentional content, in virtue of which they enter into broadly 
logical relations...These general relations exhibit a pattern which is not causal- 
nomological but rationalistic.”19 This account attempts once again to introduce an 
asymmetry between the physical bases, which physicalists understand to realise the 
higher-order properties, and those properties that are so realised. Yet at the same time, 
it appears, at least as formulated by Macdonald, to acknowledge that all the causal 
work is done at the physical level; the properties that are characteristically mental or 
biological fall into patterns or theories which explain different sorts of relations, 
normative or teleological relations. That may seem counter-intuitive. It is often 
thought to be one of the attractions of physicalism that it accounts for mental 
causation in way which does not treat psychological causes as special but as simply 
part of the normal causal order. Moreover, it is surely a strong intuition of ours that 
mental states do in fact cause physical states but the aetiological account of functional 
properties seems to deny that we understand that intuition in any straightforward 
sense. It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the specific problems any such 
account may have with mental causation. However, I think it is important to note that
19 Macdonald, C. “Psychological Supervenience, Dependency and Reduction”, p. 147 in Savellos and
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understanding the mind-body relation in a way which characterises the mental as non- 
causal will leave serious questions about the value of such account.
Whatever the short-comings of the aetiological account as an explanation of 
mental causation, I am at the moment interested in the idea as a way of supporting 
non-reductive physicalism; and that depends on construing the mental and biological 
as different from the normal causal order of things.
How successful is this strategy? I think it pays to be obdurately simple-minded 
when analysing the force of the aetiological account’s claim to be at once physicalist 
and non-reductionist. Let us first consider the doctrine as a variation on multiple- 
realisation. We can argue in a parallel fashion to the first section. Biological states are 
not type identical with their physical bases but are realised by them (and this is a 
relation which presumably holds across physically possible worlds). It would be 
natural to think then that one can assert that the biological property is equal to a 
disjunction of its physical bases: Bf = PI v P2 v .. .Pn, (where Bf is the bio-functional 
property and PI, etc. are the physical bases). Now, if such a relation holds we can 
demand, as above, that features ascribed to one-side of the relation must be ascribed to 
the other side too. So either both are kinds or neither is. Similarly either both 
properties have a teleological component or neither does. The advocate of the 
aetiological account must show us why the identity does not hold.
The answer an advocate of the aetiological account is likely to give is: because 
the biological properties supervene diachronically on their bases. Therefore, the 
identity statement as I have it cannot hold because it only links actual physical states 
with biological states; and the biological state is more than simply the physical states 
that actually underpin it; it is those physical states plus the physical states of its
Yalgin [1995]
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ancestors. One might counter that such considerations might lead us simply to 
construe the realisation relation and the identity statement historically. The states PI, 
etc. will therefore include reference to physical states of ancestors. Possibly that 
seems a little awkward. However, I doubt one need make such response, for the 
diachronic supervenience thesis is I think highly questionable anyway, if we consider 
the following example.
It is presumably possible, although unlikely (I hope) that I, as I write this 
thesis, am destroyed by a bolt of lightening. It is also possible, at least by physicalist 
lights, that an exact physical replica of my body be formed from, say, the surrounding 
material in the room (assuming, of course there was the right sort of material present). 
So we can imagine a scenario where the biologically evolved me is destroyed and a 
physical me-duplicate is spontaneously created. Now given the diachronic 
supervenience thesis holds true it would have been correct to ascribe biological 
functions or properties (and I assume by extension psychological and normative 
states) to the now, unfortunately, deceased me. The same privilege, though, cannot be 
extended to the me-duplicate since it did not evolve and has no ancestors. Now this 
seems very curious. Presumably, if physicalism is assumed to be true (i.e. that there is 
a complete physical explanation of all physical events), two physically identical 
individuals in the same environment will behave in exactly the same way (or will have 
the same chance of behaving in the same way). If created-me behaves in exactly the 
same way as evolved-me would have behaved had he not been destroyed, then on 
what grounds could we deny he had the same functional or intentional properties? If 
for example, he immediately sat down at a computer and began in a similar manner 
railing against physicalism, why would it be wrong to say that he believed 
physicalism was ill supported by science or philosophical argument? I think there can
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be no real reason. It is not clear at all how differing causal histories can legitimate the 
ascription, the real ascription, of one property to physically and environmentally 
indistinguishable creatures 20
If we are suspicious then of the claim that causal history is relevant to the
ascription of such functional properties, then we will return to our simple-minded
view that actual bases are sufficient for realisation and hence reduction. Moreover, we
are led back to our subsidiary conclusion that either both sets of properties have
teleological and normative components or neither does. But why would anyone favour
the former option? It would seem very strange to think of normative properties as part
of the basic make-up of the world. Given that it seems natural for a physicalist (or
indeed anyone) to deny normativity to the physical bases, he must deny real
normativity to the higher-order properties. In fact, this appears to be what a number of
physicalists are prepared to contemplate. As Terence Horgan puts it in his admirably
clear and candid survey of the current state of physicalism in the philosophy of mind:
“The task of explaining supervenience facts, including perhaps psychological
supervenience facts therefore...includes the task of explaining how certain objective,
in-the-world, is-ought gaps get bridged...and given that challenge...materialistically-
minded philosophers ought to be exploring irrealist ways of accommodating higher- 
0 1order discourse.”
It is well beyond the scope of the present work to address the question whether 
or not physicalism commits you to some sort of irrealism about normativity. But I feel 
obliged to say, if the irrealism is understood in eliminative terms (that is we can just 
do without the normative) then I am inclined to agree with Putnam when he says in
20 My example is of course just a variation of Donald Davidson’s [1986 swamp man, although I reach 
the opposite conclusion from him. See Sosa, E. "Abilities, Concepts and Extemalism” in Heil and Mele 
(eds.) [1995] for similar thinking to mine on the issue.
21 Horgan, T. [1993] p.581
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grand rhetorical mode: “[If the eliminativist is right] why should we expend our 
mental energy in convincing ourselves that we aren’t thinkers, that our thoughts aren’t 
really about anything, noumenal or phenomenal, that there is no sense in which any 
thing is right or wrong (including the thought that no thought is right or wrong).”22 
Indeed, an eliminativist approach would appear to threaten the whole of science itself 
since science is presumably to some extent a rule-governed activity. That being the 
case it would seem, as Putnam suggests, that eliminativism concerning the normative 
would undermine physicalism itself, for it would undermine the assertion that it was a 
better world-view than any other, since that is obviously normative notion. Of course, 
one can be irrealist with respect to a certain property without thereby being an 
eliminativist; one can be what Horgan calls a preservative irrealist. The most obvious 
form of preservative irrealism is instrumentalism, espoused most famously by Daniel 
Dennett23, and there are other irrealist possibilities countenanced by Horgan. I think 
though one should be suspicious that any non-realist understanding of the normative 
can save the physicalist from the seeming paradox of asserting that we ought to 
believe physicalism and at the same time confessing that no worldly account of the 
“ought” in that assertion can be given. To convert that intuition into an argument 
would take us too far from the main thesis and it is not clear that in the end it would 
be conclusive. It may be possible to render an ersatz normativity respectable and it 
may be possible, though I have my doubts, to be a normative realist and a physicalist.
Physicalism or Non-reductionism 
It is worth reviewing the dialectic of the argument up to this point. I have 
shown that the sort of relations non-reductive physicalists posit, supervenience or 
multiple-realisation relations, are either not sufficient to guarantee physicalism or
22 Putnam, H. [1983]p.246
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imply reduction in principle. On the way, I have suggested that certain forms of 
physicalism may either fail to address pertinent questions, for example, issues of 
mind-body causation, or teeter on self-refutation by denying the normative; but these 
have been asides to the main argument. The basic structure of that main argument has 
always been the same: given the realisation relations, no asymmetry between the base 
and higher-order properties can be maintained; hence, reductions should be 
forthcoming. Now, this might lead some to the conclusion that we should be reductive 
physicalists, certainly this is Kim’s view. However, I do not accept this. First of all, 
one should remember that all the realisation relations discussed so far are merely 
speculative. Secondly, I take it that one of the motivations for non-reductive 
physicalism was the failure of actual reductionist programmes both within philosophy 
and science. I would support that view; the arguments of the first section were meant 
to lend further support to it. Moreover, antireductionists have provided their own 
examples and case studies to lend further weight to the suggestion that actual 
reductions are unlikely to be forthcoming. I also share with the anti-reductionist a 
rejection of eliminativism for non-physical disciplines. Laws and theories of the non­
physical sciences appear to work well within their domains and hence, it would seem 
to me, we have as much (or as little) reason to treat them realistically as we do 
physics itself. Given then the foregoing argument to show that one cannot hold to 
anti-reductionism (ontologically speaking), physicalism and anti-eliminativism I, not 
surprisingly, think we should reject the belief in physicalism. The only other option 
available (rejecting eliminativism outright) is to retreat to a denial of epistemological 
reductionism, that is the possibility of actual reductions, while simultaneously 
affirming physicalism, and hence some view that commits you to reduction (or
23 Dennett, D. [1987]
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elimination) in principle of higher-order disciplines. But why should anyone do this? 
Richard Boyd24 has argued that the sort of relations conjectured to exist by 
antireductionists demonstrate that it is possible to reconcile physicalism with the 
apparent disunity of science. But since the realisation relations are only speculative, 
Boyd only shows that epistemological anti-reductionism and ontological 
reductionism, that is physicalism, are consistent. The question is given that the 
epistemological doctrine is untenable why should anyone remain committed to 
physicalism; what is the remaining attraction of physicalism?
In the next section I shall address one possible very strong motivation for 
remaining a physicalist in the absence of actual reductions in science, a belief in the 
completeness of physics. I shall show argue that this doctrine is highly questionable 
for several reasons.
24 Boyd [1980]
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QUANTUM OUANDRIES
The purpose of this section is to find the beginnings of an argument that will 
undermine physicalism. I cannot refute physicalism. One cannot refute any internally 
consistent ontological position. However, I believe I can demonstrate that physicalism 
faces serious conceptual and explanatory problems. In particular, I will argue that if 
one takes contemporary physics seriously, then one of the core principles of 
physicalism, the completeness of physics is highly questionable.
The Completeness of Physics 
Before we begin to analyse the completeness of physics, we need a definition 
of the doctrine. Papineau provides as good an account as any:
I take it that physics, unlike other special sciences is complete in the sense that all 
physical events are determined, or have their chances determined, by prior physical 
events according to physical laws. In other words, we never need to look beyond the 
realm of the physical in order to identify a set of antecedents which fixes the chance of 
any subsequent occurrence. A purely physical specification plus physical laws, will 
always suffice to tell us what happened, in so far as that can be foretold at all.1
The problem the above definition encounters, which was briefly raised in the 
last section, is explaining exactly what is meant by physics. If we identify physics 
with the discipline currently practised by scientists, it is almost certainly false. The 
very fact that physicists are currently engaged in research to account for phenomena 
which they are currently unable to explain should suggest that it is likely physics, as it 
stands now, is not complete.2 However, if we allow the physicalist to expand his 
definition of physics so that it includes whatever one needs to explain all events, it 
may encompass properties that would normally be considered non-physical. For 
example, if it turns out certain mental events or properties are required to explain
1 Papineau, D. [1993]
2 This was of course argued in the first section.
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certain physical events then those mental events would be deemed physical by such 
physicalists, which seems absurd. The completeness of physics on such a reading 
would be an analytic truth.3 In the previous section I tended towards the latter option, 
simply defining physics as the non-mental. However, I would now like to make a 
more substantial suggestion: one which will allow the physicalist to steer some course 
between the Scylla of obvious falsehood and the Charbydis of vapidity.
I suggest physicalists adopt a view with regard to current science similar to that 
of contemporary scientific realists. A physicalist should, in other words, acknowledge 
that existing scientific theories are most probably strictly false. Yet, he should 
ameliorate that pessimism with the claim that current, mature science is approximately 
true4 The ideal physical theory that forms the basis of the completeness of physics 
will be, therefore, a conservative extension of some current theory. Given the nature 
of reductionist philosophy, that big things should be explained in terms of little things, 
the only obvious candidate theory is quantum mechanics.
It will be the burden of the rest of this section to argue that certain features of 
quantum theory bring into doubt either the truth of the completeness doctrine or in 
more general terms the feasibility of physicalism. There are three consequences of 
quantum theory which, I will argue, cause problems for physicalism - indeterminism; 
indeterminacy of states; and non-locality.
Before expounding the arguments in detail, I should explain why I think these 
features must be part of some future theory. After all, while the physicalist may agree 
with me that he should view scientific theories as approximately true, he might 
maintain this commits him to nothing concrete, since he does not know which parts of 
the current theory are true (or nearly true). It would be wrong then to attempt, as I
3 Crane, T. and Mellor, D. H. [1990] argue the case that the completeness doctrine cannot avoid either
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have done, to select certain elements of the existing theory that must be retained by 
future theories. Certainly I have some sympathy with this sentiment. It is not generally 
the business of philosophers to second-guess the development of science. 
Nevertheless, in the particular case of quantum theory, certain technical results, the 
Bell theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem, place strong restrictions on the sorts 
of successor theories that could reproduce the results of quantum mechanics. To go 
into the technical detail here would be inappropriate.5 Suffice to say that the upshot of 
both theorems is that it is impossible to maintain value definiteness (hidden variables) 
and determinism unless one violates certain principles of relativity.
So much the worse for relativity theory some might think.6 Of course, equally 
one might think so much the worse for quantum mechanics. The true, complete 
physical theory may well be a radical departure from contemporary physics. So much 
so that it may make no sense to talk of recovering the results of quantum mechanics as 
the Bell theorem assumes. One must certainly accept that is a possibility. However, a 
physicalist who adopts an eliminativist line with regard to contemporary physics will I 
think be dangerously close to making his doctrine vapid. Indeed, I think such a 
dismissive attitude to present day theories does not sit well with the general character 
of physicalist philosophy. If physicalists are forced to conclude that contemporary 
physics is false, radically false, I hardly think their doctrine is worthy of the name 
physicalism. Such considerations I think should be decisive for physicalists should be
obvious falsehood or vapidity.
4 This is essentially the suggestion made by Melnyk, A. [1998]
5 One can find an accessible explanation of the technical details of Bell’s theorem and the Kochen and 
Specker argument in Hughes, R.I.G. [1989].
6 The Bohm theory is an example of such a theory. It retains a classical notion of position but implies 
the existence of privileged frame of reference (which contradicts special relativity). I do not think, 
though, we should entertain the possibility that the Bohm theory offers a quasi-classical alternative to 
quantum mechanics and thus an alternative version of physics on which to construct one’s physicalism. 
First, because no working scientists are Bohm theorists. Secondly there is no feasible extension of the 
Bohm theory to provide an analogue of quantum field theories.
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decisive for physicalists; and so the problems generated by quantum theory must be 
taken seriously.
However, if there remain doubts within physicalists ranks, we may shift the 
burden of proof. Surely it is a possibility the world is as quantum mechanics 
describes. In fact, it is a better bet, one would think that the world is that way than any 
other that we have thought of up till now. It is equally certain, I think, that no 
physicalist wants to be in the business of telling scientists that their theory is wrong 
because it clashes with their favoured ontological doctrine. So if physicalists wish to 
retain the high scientific ground, they had better be able to accommodate the 
possibility that quantum theory is true. Let us turn then with a serious mind to the 
three problems I claim quantum theory creates.
Indeterminism: A Problem of Definition7 
The problem that indeterminism creates for physicalism and the completeness 
of physics is, as I see it, one of definition. I think it is the most tractable of the 
problems I shall raise for the physicalist. It is nevertheless worth raising, if only to 
focus physicalists1 attention upon possible solutions.
Perhaps the point I wish to make can be best illustrated by a contrast with the 
deterministic case. I think it is fairly clear what the completeness doctrine entails if 
the world is deterministic. We may imagine that the world is in some physical state, P, 
at time t. The evolution of P is entirely fixed by the laws of physics such that they will 
map P onto some unique state, let us call it P(T), for any arbitrary time, T, in the 
future. Therefore, no non-physical event can have a physical effect on pain of causal 
overdetermination, which is presumably ruled out for reasons of philosophical good
7 There are obviously reasons beyond those provided by quantum theory for thinking the world is 
indeterministic. Theories of statistical mechanics and evolutionary biology seem to posit fundamental 
randomness. So the need for physicalism to be consistent with indeterminism is more pressing than perhaps any 
of the other features thrown up by quantum theory.
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taste. Allowing then that the definition of physics is true, and that overdetermination 
is forbidden, we appear to have an argument which shows that any event with 
physical effects must be a physical event and hence the beginnings of a justification of 
physicalism.
In the indeterministic world things are less neat. First of all we can see that any 
argument for physicalism that is based on considerations of overdetermination is 
bound to fail. One cannot rule out mysterious non-physical causes because they would 
overdetermine their effects, simply because given indeterminism, no event is 
determined in the first place. The overdetermination argument is, I think, a red 
herring. It is best understood not as an argument for physicalism but as a vivid, 
rhetorical way of restating the physicalist position. Given indeterminism, and thus no 
determination at all, let alone overdetermination, one needs another way of asserting 
that non-physical events have no impact on the physical world; and this is precisely 
what I take to be the definitional problem for the physicalist. How does one explain 
the idea that physics supposedly “determines the chances” of some occurrence?
Perhaps the most natural interpretation of the phrase “determined chance” is 
fixed probability. But that definition simply gives rise to the equally thorny problem 
of how to interpret probability statements. Since we are assuming these are genuinely 
chance events, obviously what is required is some sort of objectivist interpretation of 
the probability calculus, i.e. an interpretation that makes probability a property of the 
world rather than a property of our beliefs about the world. Let us suppose we opt for 
a frequentist account. How will that affect the definition of the completeness doctrine? 
The frequency interpretation equates the meaning of a probability statement with the 
ratio of positive occurrences of the event in question to the total number of trials, as 
the number of trials tends to infinity. Put less abstractly, if the probability a coin
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landing heads is 0.5 then that means, in the limit, half the coin tosses (the trials) will 
end up as heads. Given a frequentist definition of the probability calculus course it is 
fairly elementary to construct an example which satisfies the frequentist notion of 
fixed probability but which contradicts physicalism.
Imagine a situation where a physical body (let’s say it is a human body) is in 
some physical state Q and there is 0.5 probability that it will develop into state R and 
0.5 probability that it will develop into state S. Now, on the frequentists 
understanding of the probability calculus that means given an infinite number of Q 
events half will develop into R events and half will develop into S events; and that is 
all it means. Let us add to our imagined situation the fact that some mental property, 
which by construction is non-physical, occasionally affects the outcome of Q events. 
That is, it has a positive causal impact on whether or not R or S occurs. We might say 
for example that the intervention of M guaranteed an R-occurrence. Intuitively, one 
would think, such a situation violates physicalism since mental events have a positive 
effect on certain physical outcomes. However, if we imagine that M intervenes a finite 
number of times, so the overall effect of M events is negligible within the infinite 
series of Q events, then the ratio of R-occurrences and S-occurrences to the total 
number of events will be unaffected. Hence the probability will remain unchanged; 
and thus, it will in fact be correct to say that purely physical antecedents will fix the 
probability. But something has gone badly wrong, for at least sometimes it is just not
true to say that all non-physical causal factors are excluded; clearly, a frequentist
• • • • • •  8account of probability statements just will not do for a definition of physicalism.
A more promising objective formulation for a physicalist is provided by the 
propensity account. For a propensity theorist a probability is a disposition that some
8 This is a variation of Popper’s[1972] argument against the frequency interpretation.
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single object or experimental arrangement possesses. So to return to the above 
example, to say that event R has a probability of 0.5 of occurring, means Q has a 
disposition to develop into R states half the time. The putative dispositional property 
is taken to explain the emergence of the statistical frequencies which probabilities are 
tested against. This definition clearly overcomes the problem I outlined for the 
frequency view. Given an intervention by some mental property M, in a series of Q- 
events, if M has a positive effect on either an R or S occurrence, that will change the 
propensity, and hence the probability, of that particular trial producing that particular 
result. Consequently, one would seem to save the intuition that in a physicalist world, 
mental properties or events should not have an effect on physical outcomes. However, 
if  we make the example more complicated it does not straightforwardly follow that 
given a fixed propensity one rules out mental intervention.
Consider a situation in which the physical factors X,Y and Z determine the 
propensity of some event, W, occurring. We might imagine that sometimes when the 
events X, Y, Z occur they are preceded by another physical event, D. D in turn causes 
two events, a mental event M and a physical event P. Event M has a positive causal 
impact on the outcome, that is by itself it would make the occurrence of W more 
likely. P has a negative impact on the overall outcome of W. It just so happens that M 
and P never occur in this world without being preceded by D. It further happens to be 
the case that the amount which M increases the probability is exactly cancelled out by 
the amount which P decreases the probability. So the propensity of X, Y, and Z to 
cause W is unaffected by the additional physical factor D. Should we conclude, 
though, that these three factors are the only relevant causes? I think not, since the way 
I constructed the situation ensured M had a positive effect on the outcome of event W.
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The argument here focuses not on the interpretation of the probability calculus but 
how the concepts of probability and causation are connected9
Certainly the example is highly abstract and highly unlikely but that should not 
affect its significance. I am trying to provide scenarios were the physicalist definition 
does not seem to guarantee their doctrine. Clearly, the example shows that the notion 
of probabilities being fixed, in some sense, by physical antecedents is no guarantee 
that non-physical causes are doing no work. Nevertheless, I think the problem could 
be resolved by physicalists. A closer analysis of what we might mean by fixed 
probability or determined chance, combined with an analysis of probabilistic 
causation, and how non-sufficient probabilistic causes may contribute to determining 
the same effect would be a start. It is beyond the scope of the present work to attempt 
to discuss any of these issues here in the depth they demand. But before these issues 
are resolved I do no think one can give a clear explanation of what is meant by the 
completeness of physics for an indeterministic universe.
Quantum Mechanics and the Indeterminacy of States
There are more substantial objections to physicalism to be found in the details 
of quantum theory. However, this will require some explication (but not too technical) 
of the formalism of quantum mechanics.
Consider an electron, according to physics electrons has certain properties: 
energy, mass, spin, momentum, etc. Let us focus one of those properties, spin. I 
choose spin not because there is anything in particular special about this property in 
terms of its quantum description but because it will make the explanation easier. 
Spin’s appeal is that for an electron at least, it can only assume one of two values 
(eigenvalues): it is either spin up or spin down. The obvious disadvantage of selecting
9 This is of course just a variation of the argument of Hesslow’s [1976] that causation does not
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this property is that it has no classical analogue, so it is perhaps difficult to obtain an 
intuitive grasp of what is being discussed. If the reader finds that he is uncomfortable 
with the strange property spin, then he may replace talk of spin with one of the other 
more familiar properties. Nevertheless, he should appreciate that although this will not 
change the nature my analysis, it would make the examples more complicated since, 
in the case of the other properties, the electron has an infinite number of possible 
values it might take on.
In order to discern the value of spin for a particular electron, we must measure 
the spin along some particular axis. By convention we name one such axis of 
measurement the x-axis. Let us imagine we have just measured the spin of the particle 
along the x-axis and we have discovered the electron is in a spin up state. We label the 
quantum state of the electron which corresponds to that result |UPx) (and we call this 
an “eigenvector”). Quantum measurements are such that if I were to immediately 
remeasure the spin of the electron along the x-axis we would always obtain the result, 
spin UPx10, since the particle remains in the state |UPx). No great surprise. However, 
if we now take the same electron and try to measure the spin of that particle along 
some different axis, say the y-axis, things start to become stranger. Sometimes when 
we measure the electron it will be spin up, that is in state |UPy), and sometimes it will 
be spin down, that is in state |DOWNy). A natural conclusion to draw from these 
results would be that some electrons that have the property UPx also have the property 
UPy and some have the property DOWNy. One would then expect that, if we 
measured the electron along the x-axis of spin immediately after it had been measured 
along the y-axis, we would always obtain the result spin UPx. This is not the case. 
The measurement of the system along the y-axis in some way disturbs the quantum
necessarily imply probabilistic variation.
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system so that the outcome of measurement along the x-axis becomes totally 
randomised, sometimes one obtains the result UPx and sometimes the result DOWNx. 
This strange effect is a consequence of what is known in quantum theory as the 
incompatibility of the two variables, spin along the x-axis, and spin along the .y-axis. 
Other pairs of properties are also incompatible, for example position and momentum; 
energy and time; the various components of angular momentum with each other. The 
consequence of this incompatibility is that it is impossible to have definite values for 
incompatible pairs simultaneously. So given that we have obtained a definite value for 
spin along the y-axis, we cannot provide a definite value for the spin along the x-axis, 
it is neither spin UPx, nor spin DOWNx. However, one can represent the state of the 
system for the spin x-component after such a measurement, in the following way: 
A(a|UPx) + b|DOWNx», where, a and b are constants and A is some normalisation 
factor. This is called a superposition of states. Although the superposition itself does 
not represent a definite value, it does allow one to predict precisely the probability 
that either an |UPx) or |DOWNx) state will occur after measurement. It is these 
superposed states that I think are likely to cause problems for physicalism.
A first naive argument against the physicalist might be to say that superposed 
quantum states do not represent definite properties and hence cannot form the bases 
for a physical description of the world. As Jeffrey Poland puts it in defining his 
physicalism: “[I]f there is no fact of the matter regarding as to what objects are 
included in the bases, then there is no fact of the matter regarding what the theses 
[physicalism] are expressing, and hence there is no fact of the matter regarding 
whether the theses are true or false. Vacuous or indeterminate content, therefore,
101 hope the nomenclature here is clear: the unbracketed state represents the value after measurement, 
the bracketed state is the wave equation.
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undermines the significance of physicalist doctrine and obstructs the attainment of the 
goals of the physicalist programme.”11
The anti-physicalist might argue then that because superposed states are value 
indefinite, there is no fact of the matter that the electron is in one state or the other. 
Hence, a physicalist could not assert, say P = m, where P is a physical property and m 
a non-physical property, because P is not well defined for any superposed states (and 
all quantum states are superpositions under some description). But Poland has an 
obvious reply: “the wave function gives very definite descriptions of the system in 
terms of the probability distributions; such descriptions give a complete 
characterisation of the system. Thus for any such description or associated probability 
distribution there is a fact of the matter whether it is in the physical bases. What more 
could anyone ask for in characterising such bases?”12
In other words, Poland is prepared to characterise the physical bases as 
completely and determinately described by the superposed states.13 Now, this may 
answer the naive objection that the bases are ill defined. But it simply gives rise to a 
more profound problem. Namely, if superposed quantum systems are the base 
physical states, then how do they give rise to macroscopic phenomena which never 
appear to be in superpositions but always in some definite property state? We seem to 
have simply reversed the direction of the mystery. Looking down from the 
macroscopic domain to the quantum domain, one cannot understand how quantum 
states can be well defined. Looking up from the quantum domain, we cannot see how 
to recover the macrophysical image.
11 Poland [1994], p. 148
12 ibid. P. 174
13 Poland also suggests that the definite value states acquired after measurement could also form base 
properties. However, one should remember they are only definite states from one perspective. For an 
incompatible variable such terms will be superpositions of states.
60
This question is in fact closely related to what is known as the “measurement 
problem” in quantum theory. It is perhaps easier to appreciate the force of the 
objection in terms of that problem. To explain the details of the measurement 
problem, we need a richer account of quantum theory than has been given up till now.
Quantum mechanical states are governed by the Schrodinger equation, which 
tells us how some state, say, |UPx), develops through time. After some time |UPx) 
will develop into some superposition of |UPx )and |DOWNx) states. However, on 
measurement, as was implicit in my earlier discussion, the wave equation “collapses” 
from a superposed state to an eigenvector either |UPx) or |DOWNx). The problem 
here is that the measurement interaction is not part of the Schrodinger evolution of the 
system; it is a new type of interaction. If one treats the measuring apparatus like a 
quantum system that interacts with the electron, then one does not obtain a 
determinate property state but an entangled system of the form:
|M(UPx)> |UPx) + |M(DOWNx)> |DOWNx>, where |M(UPx)> and 
|M(DOWNx)>, represent the states of the measuring apparatus for measurements of 
|UPx) and |DOWNx) respectively. But of course we never do observe situations like 
this. In fact, we probably cannot even begin to comprehend how we could observe 
superpositions of states. Measurement then appears to induce a different sort of 
interaction not captured in quantum theory. The conceptual problem is how to 
understand what is special about measurement interactions that takes particles from 
superposed states to definite property states. And this is just the problem of how 
quantum systems relate to macroscopic systems, since the measuring device is a 
macrosystem.
Some of the solutions mooted both by philosophers and by physicists to 
account for wave function collapse should also be disturbing for a physicalist. For
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example, Neils Bohr thought that collapse was induced when the system interacted 
with an irreducibly classical macroscopic object. He thus denied the possibility that 
one could apply quantum theory to the measuring apparatus. Irreducibly classical 
features that are always external to quantum theory, according to Bohr, govern 
measurement interactions. Hence, the completeness of quantum theory is 
undermined.14 A similar but more extreme view, held by Eugene Wigner15, attributes 
collapse to the interaction of the human mind with the system. Again, non-physical, in 
this case mental, causes are taken to affect quantum events; again completeness is 
undermined.
The above views both attribute collapse to some non-quantum element of the 
measuring situation. Thus both seem inevitably to lead to viewing quantum theory as 
incomplete. However, there are interpretations that deny this duality between quantum 
system and measuring system. Such interpretations, inspired by the seminal work of 
Hugh Everett in, all deny there is any such thing as wave collapse. The great 
advantage of these interpretations is that they allow one to treat the measuring system 
as a quantum system. On the other hand the major problem for such accounts is to 
explain why we think we see collapses and never superpositions. Explanations have 
split into two competing accounts: the many worlds view and the many minds 
interpretation. The former interpretation states that during measurement interactions 
the universe splits into many universes each one corresponding to each possible 
outcome of measurement.16 The latter formulation makes the comparatively speaking
17more modest suggestion that the human mind splits when measurement takes place. 
So, although on both accounts the universe is actually in a superposed state because
141 mean completeness here in the sense formulated by Papineau in his description of the completeness 
of physics, not the sort of completeness of quantum theory that is discussed in EPR-type phenomenon.
15 See Hughes [1989] for a discussion of Wigner’s and Bohr’s position.
16 DeWitt, B. [1970]
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my mind or body splits during measurement, I am confined to represent the world in a 
nonsuperposed way. There are technical problems with both approaches, in particular 
when it comes to understanding what the probability assignments in quantum theory 
mean. But such technical problems are not, I think, the cause of the resistance 
amongst philosophers of physics to either view. I take it that what most find 
objectionable, and no doubt what any lay physicist will think too, is that such views 
are fantastical. Who could believe in splitting worlds or minds? But what that strong 
intuitive objection expresses, I think, is a dissatisfaction with these theories’ attempts 
to explain the emergence of the macroscopic image. In fact, both interpretations make 
our perception of the macroscopic world false (or at best seriously incomplete). They 
are, in other words, eliminative about the macroscopic image of the world.181 doubt it 
is the sort of world-view most physicalists will find satisfactory. Furthermore, it is 
doubtful whether such theories have really explained measurement interaction and the 
connection between the quantum and the macroscopic level. What for example is so 
special about measurement interactions that they cause splits in the universe or minds. 
Why do splits not equally occur at lower levels of reality? In short, the proposed 
solutions to the measurement problem seem either to lead to the imposition of non­
quantum causes or to understanding the world as completely different from the way 
we think it is. But neither type of view elucidates the relation between the 
macroscopic and the quantum. One asserts simply there is a strong dichotomy and the 
other fails to give an adequate answer to why we think there is a strong dichotomy.
Now, it may be the case that some as yet undeveloped account or extension of 
quantum theory will make the connection between the macroscopic and quantum
17 See Albert, D [1992]. Ch. 6 and 8
18 In fact, the many minds view (or rather its extension to quantum field theory) is consistent with the 
universe being in a vacuum state, that is empty although because of the superposed states we think 
otherwise. See Albert [1992] Ch. 6 for a brief explanation.
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domains clear and uncontroversial. Moreover, it may emerge in a way that will allow 
one to treat measuring devices as governed by the same principles of interaction as 
electrons. But no such account is immediately forthcoming. The two types of 
“solution” to the measurement problem I have discussed are the only major 
alternatives on offer. That, in itself should be sufficient to cast doubt upon the idea 
that the physicalist can assert the sort of dependency relations which form the 
backbone of their position.
Non-localitv: A Problem for Parochial Phvsicalisms
The problem of understanding how the quantum and the macroscopic image 
relate, I take to be the most serious difficulty posed by quantum theory for 
physicalism. However, superposed states have another property that will cause certain 
construals of physicalism profound problems of adifferent kind. A few more elements 
need to be added to the account of quantum theory so far given to bring this point out.
The measurement problem arises from attempting to treat the measuring 
apparatus as a quantum system, the result is not a collapse but what I called an 
entangled system. Quantum particles can also be come involved in such entangled 
systems. Let us imagine then that two electrons have interacted in a way that leaves 
them in an entangled state. We can describe the spin-x states of the system as 
follows:
1A/2(|UPx)i|DOWNx>2 - |DOWNx>i|UPx)2),
where the subscripts distinguish the states corresponding to the two electrons. This 
complicated expression tells us a number of things. First, that if we measure the spin 
state of electron 1, there is 0.5 probability it will turn out spin up. If such a result is 
obtained on measurement, then the above state vector collapses to the form:
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|UPx)i|D0WNx>2. This expression tells us, without need to measure the second 
electron, that it must be in a spin down state. Conversely if we obtain a measurement 
of spin down for electron 1, electron 2 must be in a spin up state. Why should one 
think this is curious? Well, the two electrons that interact could be miles and miles, 
galaxies and galaxies apart before one is measured. We must also remember that 
quantum theory as I have described it does not allow us to think of the particles 
having definite values before measurement.19 Hence, the properties exhibited by 
electron 2, that is whether it is in a superposed state or eigenstate, will depend on 
something which happens to electron 1 and that could be an event on the other side of 
the universe.
This result should be disturbing to physicalists who understand the relation 
between parts and wholes as one in which the properties of the whole depend upon the 
properties of the parts. Here we seem to have the exact opposite. The properties of the 
whole, that is the entangled quantum state as described above, appear to determine the 
properties of the constituent individuals, the two electrons. Moreover, it does so in a 
way that undercuts many intuitions concerning part-whole relations. That is, a natural 
physicalist assumption is that the properties of macrosystems will be entirely 
explained in terms of the intrinsic properties of microparticles and their extrinsic 
relations with each other. But if any the microparticles are entangled with particles not 
thought to be part of the system, one is able to affect the properties of the macrosytem 
by interfering with a quantum entangled object which may be spatially far removed 
from it.
19 This is in fact what the Bell theorem, that I somewhat enigmatically referred to in the opening 
section, tells us. If we assume that the electrons have definite, hidden values we will get different 
results from those predicted by quantum theory. Experiments have been conducted by Aspect to test 
these alternative views: all have confirmed quantum mechanics and disconfirmed the local, hidden 
variants. See Hughes, R.I.G.[1989] for details.
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20Paul Teller has used such considerations to argue against what he calls local
physicalism and in favour of global (or holistic) physicalism, a view which is not
dissimilar to the global supervenience doctrine, briefly discussed in the last section.
Certainly I think it is possible to retain some sort of physicalist position, given these
specific considerations. Perhaps, in light of non-locality, the idea that moving a few
hydrogen atoms could radically alter the distribution of mental properties is not so
bizarre after all, if we imagine these atoms are entangled with distant, macroscopic 
0 1physical states. Perhaps, or perhaps these strange results are just further evidence 
that we do not have a natural way of reconciling the quantum domain, where non­
locality is rife, and the macroscopic image were our intuitive understanding of causal 
interactions allow only local correlations between states.
Where to now?
Of the three problems I have presented for physicalism: indeterminism, non­
locality and indeterminacy, the greatest of these is undoubtedly indeterminacy. Each 
though has a certain potency. The weakest is undoubtedly, the argument from 
indeterminism. I have shown that at least for certain situations and certain 
interpretations of the probability calculus, that the simple notion of physical 
antecedents fixing the probability is not enough to guarantee physicalism. This should 
focus physicalist minds on the question of how probabilities and causes should be 
related in a physicalist world. I imagine this can be done in a way that is satisfactory 
to physicalists. The argument from non-locality is decisive against certain forms of 
physicalism. It completely alters our understanding of compositional claims, and the 
general reductionist claim that big things are made of little things; however, it will 
have no affect on others who take a more holistic view. The problems, though, of
20 Teller, P. [1986], See also “A Contemporary Look at Emergence” in de Beckermann, Flohr and
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indeterminacy are both profound and wide-ranging. The fact that we cannot 
understand how properties of the quantum level relate, or could relate, to higher-order 
properties should encourage us to look beyond physicalism and explore other options. 
This will be the objective of the final section. It is to be hoped that by laying bare 
other ontological options one will be better able to assess the value of the various 
alternatives to physicalism.
Kim(eds.) [1992]
21 See pages 37-38 for a discussion of global supervenience.
EMERGENT ALTERNATIVES
It is not enough simply to show the limitations of a physicalist ontology. After 
all, it is never the case that a philosophical research programme is dead and buried. 
Perhaps a new form of physicalism will be able to overcome the various problems I 
have described. Perhaps some may feel that whatever the problems with physicalism it 
is still the most promising point of view from a naturalist perspective and that 
perspective is the only reasonable one. The objective of this section of the paper is to 
explore and recommend alternative avenues of enquiry, which will not be physicalist 
but will still be scientifically respectable.
I shall lead this grand tour under the banner title of emergent properties, 
although perhaps some of the views I shall discuss will not be thought to fit naturally 
under this heading. The discussion will be divided into three broad categories of 
emergent positions. By far the largest group of ontologies I shall consider will be 
bottom-up emergentist strategies; the second shall be what I deem top-down emergent; 
and the last and I shall argue the most promising will be discussed under the epithet of 
cross-ways emergent. The significance of each of the names will become apparent 
during the discussion.
Some Preliminary Considerations
Before I develop any account in detail, some general remarks need to be made 
about the concept of emergence itself. Emergence most broadly defined simply means 
the coming into being of something new: a property, law or relation or whatever. 
Defined in this vague manner, many, if not all, physicalists will accept some type of 
emergence. It is practically a truism to say that there are some properties that exist 
now which did not exist at one time or other. For example, the property of being a 
human is something which emerged through the process of evolution. But for a
68
physicalist this should not be worrying since presumably he understands the process of 
evolution to be an entirely physical process, with an entirely physical explanation. 
Similarly, employing again the criterion that an emergent is a new property, one might 
claim that certain relational properties are in some sense emergent. If I place an object, 
A next to an object, B, it becomes an emergent property of A that it is next to B; again 
this is trivial and of no threat to physicalism. Since we are interested in emergence as 
providing an alternative to a physicalist ontology we shall need to differentiate these 
physicalistically speaking respectable notions of emergence from more robust forms 
emergence. That is to say, we shall be interested in defining emergence in a way that 
excludes physicalism.
Bottom-up Strategies
Bottom-up emergentists share many assumptions with non-reductive 
physicalists. They believe for example, that reality can be divided into various layers. 
Like physicalists, they place physics at the bottom, next chemistry, then biology, etc. 
all the way up to the human mind. In fact, the only area of profound disagreement 
concerns what the relations between the layers of reality actually are. I shall attempt to 
articulate this emergentist position by contrasting it with physicalism. I shall argue that 
given it shares so many assumptions with physicalism, it will not provide a compelling 
alternative ontology.
I have argued in section II that if a physicalist wishes to be a realist about 
apparently non-physical properties then those properties must be identical to some 
physical property or set of physical properties. Bottom-up emergentists, on other hand, 
can allow for more permissive relations between the layers of reality. The relevant 
contrast is neatly illustrated by considering the labours of God.
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According to the physicalist all God has to do is write the laws of physics, set up 
the initial conditions of the universe, wind up the clock and let everything run. 
Everything follows as a consequence of the physical state of the universe. For a 
bottom-up emergentist God must be more industrious. In addition to creating all the 
physical facts and laws, he must also create non-physical facts, properties and laws 
which connect these non-physical states to each other and the base level physical 
states. So, God creates autonomous laws for higher-order disciplines and laws which 
link the various layers with each other.1 Such a view then embraces what in Nagel- 
style accounts of theoretical reduction were thought to be bridge laws. However, the 
bottom-up emergentist makes them sui generis, as fundamental and irreducible as 
physics itself.
Some elaboration here is needed to explicate the kinds of laws and connections 
between properties and their parts that are emergent, in a metaphysically interesting 
sense, and those which remain physicalistically “kosher”. James Van Cleve2 has 
suggested that the relevant contrast between emergent and non-emergent strategies is 
that the connections between part-whole relations that are emergent are nomological, 
whereas the connnections between part-whole relations that are non-emergent are 
logical. That would seem congruent with my characterisation of physicalism. That is, 
the only way to bridge the layers of reality is by the use of identity statements. 
However, Van Cleve thinks this distinction applies across the board so any connection 
between parts and wholes which is only nomological is in some sense emergent. But 
this cannot be right for many part-whole property relations. To take a trivial example, 
the mass of a higher level systems is not logically dependent upon the mass of the 
subsystems. In the case of hydrogen, for example, the following relation is true:
1 These creation stories are due to Tim Crane [1991]
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Mhydrogen < Melectron + Mproton. The actual mass of hydrogen depends on the binding 
energy between the electron and proton; that is upon some law of nature governing the 
interaction of the two particles. But this is not emergence of the metaphysically 
interesting kind that a physicalistic is likely to deny. In fact, leaving Spinozistic 
rationalism to one side, it is questionable whether there really are any compositional 
principles that are logically necessary. Van Cleve suggests position but even this I 
think can be disputed. For any system in which the parts are held together by some 
force, if the forces were different i.e. the laws of nature were different, then the 
positions of the parts would be different too. So any philosophical position that denied 
such logically contingent compositional principles would be obviously false; and 
whatever the short comings of physicalism, this is not something which I think it can 
fairly be accused of. Granting such nomological compositional principles are 
acceptable for a physicalist, a second way of bridging the connection between the 
layers of reality becomes possible. The physicalist need simply claim that the property 
which is thought to be novel at some level of reality is actually a latent property of 
physical reality. Its apparent emergence, that is its existence at one level of reality and 
not another, is accounted for by some law of nature linking its latent state to an actual 
state. Such an ontology might be thought unattractive for a variety of reasons. The 
notion of a latent property may strike one as ad hoc and in need of explanation itself. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly a possibility open to a physicalist philosopher.
We may summarise this discussion up to this point by considering four 
principles, various combinations of which will yield different versions of physicalism, 
emergentism and more esoteric ontologies:
2 Van Cleve, J. [1990]
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(1) The completeness of microphysics or, if you prefer, reductionism. The 
view that physics is, in principle, able to account for all physical events.
(2) Logical connection of properties. Higher-order non-physical properties are 
identical to or logically derivable from, the base level physical properties.
(3) Nomological relation of properties. Higher-order properties are 
nomologically dependent (either deterministically or indeterministically) on physical 
properties i.e. there exist some “bridging laws” between the domains of reality.
(4) The various layers of reality are entirely independent of one another.
All physicalists must maintain (1). They may do so with (2) alone or with (3) 
also, if the higher-order properties are construed as latent properties of the physical 
base. Combining (1) and (4) we obtain a version of parallelism. If we combine (1) 
with (3) then we can derive an emergent ontology, although not a very interesting one. 
If the law relating higher-order and base properties is deterministic, then a form of the 
epiphenomenalist/supervenience view discussed in section II emerges. If the 
connections are understood as indeterministic, then one still obtains a version of 
epiphenomenalism but the supervenience thesis no longer holds, since it is presumably 
possible to have changes in the mental (chance changes) without changes in the 
physical. Epiphenomenalism is I take it not a position that we should take seriously. 
Surely we want our higher-order properties to be causally efficacious. The interesting 
emergentist alternatives involve an affirmation of (3) and a denial of (1). That is to 
say, the doctrines we will be concerned with will suggest some sort of interactionist 
model which will allow us to understand how higher-order properties can affect lower- 
order properties. This is in broad outline the view I would attribute to such
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philosophers as Lloyd-Morgan3, Alexander4 and Broad5. (Hereafter I shall refer to the 
three philosophers as the classical emergentists.) It is this version of bottom-up 
ontology that I will now turn to investigate. I shall argue that although the classical 
emergentist position is conceptually sound, it does not provide an attractive alternative 
ontology to physicalism.
The Classical Emergentists: A Model of Emergent Causation 
The classical emergentist divided the laws of nature into two types: “intra- 
ordinal”, laws between entities or properties of the same layer of reality, and “trans- 
ordinal”6, laws that cross layers, such as psychophysical laws which cite emergent 
properties. Physicalism as we said admits the existence of the former but denies the 
existence of the latter. Two questions might be asked about these trans-ordinal laws. 
Where do these non-physical properties or parts come from which feature in these 
laws and how are they causally efficacious?
As to the question of how to account for the emergence of these genuinely novel 
properties, the classical emergentists had no answer. It was something that simply had 
to be accepted with, to use Alexander’s phrase, “natural piety”. I think this should be 
no surprise. Any call for a further explanation of higher level properties can only be a 
plea for a reductionist7 explanation. However, the classical emergentists did attempt to 
explain how emergent properties might be causally efficacious. I shall concentrate in 
the following paragraphs on Broad’s account for it is the most fully developed.
Broad thought that notion of causal efficacy was intimately tied to that of force; 
for there to be causes there must be forces produced somewhere. He also noted that
3 Lloyd-Morgan [1923]
4 Alexander, S. [1920]
5 Broad, C.D. [1926], I am particularly indebted to the works of Blitz [1990] and the Beckermann, A ., 
Flohr, H. and Kim, J. [1992] volume for my understanding of the classical emergentists position
6 Some emergentists share Crane’s belief that trans-ordinal relations may be indeterministic.
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Newton’s second law of motion, F=ma, said nothing specifically about where those 
forces arose. Certainly it was true that in the case of gravity any body with a mass 
would generate an attractive force between it and other massive bodies, but Broad 
thought that this was the exception rather than the rule. Most forces, he thought, will 
be active only in particular circumstances, under special conditions. Electromagnetic 
forces, for instance, only operate for charged bodies, and not all bodies are charged. 
Broad thus thought it was reasonable to postulate what might be called 
“configurational forces”, forces which like electromagnetic forces act when certain 
conditions are fulfilled. A configurational force though is very different from the 
notion of force used standardly in physics. All the supposedly fundamental forces that 
we know of in physics involve interactions between pairs of particles. A 
configurational force, though, is a force exerted when, as the name would suggest, 
certain configurations of particles are present. It is also important to realise that for the 
classical emergentists these forces are as fundamental as any physical force, since the 
properties requisite for their functioning will be emergent properties and emergent 
properties are, of course, not reducible to other properties. The idea is of course 
speculative; we do not know of any configurational forces. Nevertheless they will 
explain how the emergentist can account for what Kim calls “downward causation”. 
That is, how higher-order properties can have a causal impact on lower-order 
properties. Certain particles, involving emergent properties, take on certain 
configurations and these configurations produce forces which are exerted on physical 
particles (that is some body with a mass). One should note though that although such 
an ontology breeches the completeness of physics, since certain physical events have 
partial non-physical causes, it does not mean that the forces of physics disappear or 
become false in certain situations. Rather, Broad believed that the overall influence,
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that is to say the total force, acting on some body would be the vector sum of all the 
physical, gravitational, electromagnetic, etc., forces plus the configurational forces. So 
we can make physical and non-physical causes peacefully cohabit, without 
overdetermination, on this view.
One possible line of objection to this view might be that if configurational forces 
exist at all they must be part of physics like (apparently) all other forces. So if such 
forces exist they simply show that higher-order disciplines, inasmuch as they involve 
forces, are dependent upon on or part of physics. Certainly this is true in a very broad 
sense, the fundamental laws of mechanics, i.e. Newton’s laws, are necessary to make 
sense of configurational forces (or any force for that matter). Nevertheless, I take it the 
classical emergentists were making a claim about the nature of forces that might 
feature in a true theory of mechanics. The claim being that certain forces were not 
physical forces, that is interactions between pairs of fundamental particles but were 
induced by emergent properties.
I do not doubt that the classical emergentist notion of configurational forces 
outlined above is internally consistent. However, I think it is unlikely to provide the
o
foundation for a strong alternative to physicalism. Contra, Brian McLaughlin, I do not 
believe that this is because there has been a successful reduction of chemistry to 
quantum mechanics. The empirical issue is unresolved. We do not know, as I have 
argued at length, or even have good evidence for thinking that everything (or even 
chemistry for that matter) can be explained in terms of physics (whatever that turns out 
to be). A fortiori, we do not know as McLaughlin claims that: “it is a fact about the 
world that the fundamental forces which influence acceleration are all exerted at the
8 McLaughlin, B. “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism” in Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., Kim, 
J.(ed.) [1992] Of course, we actually have no adequate account of how the gravitational force might be 
exerted at the sub-atomic level, so McLaughlin claim is ore than a little presumptuous.
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subatomic level”9. Equally we have no evidence, as McLaughlin rightly asserts, for the 
existence of anything like configurational forces. So why should we prefer one 
ontology over the other? If we understand the relation between chemistry and physics 
to involve a partial explanation of one theory in terms of another, rather than a 
reduction, then a related but weaker criticism can be levelled at emergentism. The 
emergentist needs to draw a clear boundary between the emergent and the non- 
emergent. He needs to know when configurational forces will apply and when they 
will not. But partial reductions are likely to force emergentists to redraw their 
boundaries. The emergentist is likely to have to make ad hoc adjustments in the light 
of scientific advances. The physicalist on the other hand has no such problems, for he 
expects one type of explanation to cover, in principle, everything. The fact that it does 
not at the moment he can always dismiss as merely a limitation of our present 
knowledge.
In fact, given that both views accept the primacy of physics, that is they place 
the science at the heart of their ontologies, physicalism is always going to look a better 
bet. Physicalism at least holds out the possibility of explaining the existence of higher- 
order properties which the emergentist just takes to be brute facts. In contrast, 
emergentism of this bottom-up sort seems to trade in mystery. Once you have accepted 
the primacy of physics, physicalism, it seems provides a richer research programme 
for science. Because of this appeal to the inexplicable, and the emergentists inevitable 
defensive retreat in light of certain scientific advances, I think one can hardly deny 
that physicalism is more appealing.
Contemporary discussions of emergentism have been content to stop at the 
classical emergentist position and conclude as I have done that although consistent, it
9 ibid. p.91
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seems a little strange and runs against the grain of scientific progress. I suppose this 
sort of thinking is meant to lend oblique support to physicalism as it removes a 
possible competitor ontology. But the real fault of bottom-up physicalism I think is 
that it shares too many principles in common with physicalism. A genuine alternative 
to physicalism I suggest will have to question the primacy of physics in its ontology. It 
will therefore require a more radical conceptual shift than is offered by bottom-up 
emergence. It is to these models I now turn.
Top-Down Emergence
What I have dubbed top-down emergence does provide such a radical alternative 
to reductionist thinking. Unfortunately, I think the position as it articulated and 
defended by its main (possibly only) advocate Joseph Margolis is also flawed and for 
similar reasons to bottom-up emergent strategies. I cannot possibly do justice to the 
Homeric qualities of Margolis’s extensive and scholarly work here so I shall confine 
myself to recounting the basic plot line.
Margolis, like many who call themselves non-reductive physicalists, believes 
that there are certain functional properties, in particular mental states, which are not 
reducible to physical states. However, unlike the non-reductive physicalists discussed 
in section two he does not base his philosophy on supervenience or multiple- 
realisation arguments. Margolis thinks the positions put forward by philosophers such 
as Putnam, Davidson and Fodor render functional properties epiphenomenal or as he 
puts it “practicably eliminable”. The only way to guarantee that fiinctional properties 
are real, causally efficacious and non-reducible to physical entities is by making them 
“indissolubly complex, incarnate and emergent with regard to some physical or 
biological sector”. This notion of functional properties as incarnate is what ground
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Margolis’s emergentism. Incarnate properties are supposed to have parts which are 
inseparably physical or biological but which do not reduce to these parts.
None of this marks out Margolis’s position as particularly special. His notion of 
incarnate property does not sound that different from the emergent properties 
discussed by philosophers like Broad. What is distinctive about his philosophy then is 
not so much the ontological structure of the emergent properties but the properties he 
deems emergent and how, according to Margolis we come to know about them in the 
first place. Margolis claims that all artifactual objects, that is entities which have 
cultural or linguistical components, are emergent or incarnate in his sense. 
Michaelangelo’s Pieta is a favourite example of his. The statue, Margolis argues, is 
more than the mere sum of its proper physical parts and that more comes from 
understanding the object as a work of art or culture.
Why is this top-down emergence? Margolis combines this notion of emergence 
with what he calls the “bifurcation of the sciences”. That is to say, the methodology 
for discovering truths in the social science will have to be different from the natural 
sciences because we can only come to know these culturally incarnate properties self- 
reflexively, not empirically. The implications go deeper than just this bifurcation of 
methodology since the natural sciences themselves are products of human culture. As 
Margolis puts it: “Our understanding the natural world already presupposes and 
entails the reality of human culture; and that mode of understanding presupposes and 
entails our own understanding of our cultural world.”10 Hence, our understanding of 
incarnate properties must precede our understanding of any supposedly physical, 
property. In other words, our knowledge of emergent properties must proceed top-
10 Margolis, J. [1986] p.374
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down. That is, from our understanding of ourselves to what we take to be the natural 
world.11
I have no doubt that Margolis’s work raises important issues. In a much more 
direct way, for example, it tackles some of the concerns I raised in section two. 
Namely, can we accommodate the normative or the culturally rule-governed in a 
physicalist ontology? If not, then how can we accommodate the discipline of physics 
itself on which physicalists base or hope to base their ontology? It is posing questions 
like this that makes Margolis doubt that traditional functionalist accounts are adequate 
to ensure the causal efficacy of just those functional properties. But just as I was 
ambivalent before about the possibility of a physicalist making sense of the normative, 
so I am now ambivalent about Margolis’s programme. On the negative side, 
Margolis’s position seems to teeter dangerously close to idealism. One in which we 
are trapped by our own language and culture into seeing the world in a particular way. 
Margolis denies this is what his position entails. Yet it is difficult to make sense of his 
claims about the cultural status of science and that emergent properties can only be 
studied top-down, if he is not offering something like idealism.
Equally though when he sounds less idealist and more explicit about his 
explanation of emergence, his position tends to come across as a version of classical 
emergentism. Consider the following passage: “...within some critical stage of 
development of the biologically grounded capacities of human beings -  in a way that, 
quite frankly no-one understands -  structures begin to emerge, that depend upon the 
incipient reflexive capacities of the species.”12 Again, it seems that like Alexander, 
Margolis thinks emergence is something you must accept with “natural piety”. But if 
Margolis’s emergentism steers towards more traditional accounts, I think it will come
11 Note this an epistemological point about our grasp of the properties, not the properties themselves.
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unstuck for similar reasons to the classical emergentists. The emergence of these 
reflexive properties is mysterious. Moreover, at the ontological level, Margolis retains 
it appears some sort of heirarchical notion of the levels of science; that is biological 
structures emerge from physical structures and social and cultural structures emerge 
from biological structures. But that is simply to acknowledge the general ontological 
structure of physicalism; except that a physicalist is able to fashion the structure into a 
more economical, less mysterious philosophy.
There are good intentions in Margolis’s philosophy. His desire, for example, to 
make functional properties causally efficacious is certainly something I share. 
However, I am not convinced that Margolis’s idea of an incarnate property and his 
consequent appeal to the bifurcation of the sciences is the right way to proceed. Even 
if we could make sense of his philosophy in a way that avoided both idealism and 
classical emergentism, I think we should reject his position. Firstly, because I think we 
have reason to be non-reductionist before we even encounter functional properties; 
and secondly because I do not find any reasonable argument for the bifurcation of the 
sciences in the text which does not already presuppose Margolis’s notion of an 
incarnate property.
Cross-wavs Emergence
Much of what I have said thus far has had little bearing on the arguments I 
offered against reductionism and physicalism in the preceding sections sections. I wish 
now to describe an ontology much more consonant with those arguments. In section 
one, I argued for the disunity of the sciences. Even sciences which were supposedly 
close to another, like physics and chemistry, or the disciplines which make up physics 
itself do not support strong reductive positions. In section three I argued that there was
12 Ibid. p.374
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an enormous conceptual gap between the quantum and the classical worlds. The 
conclusion to draw from these arguments it seems to me is that the sciences are not a 
hierarchically ordered system in which physics is king. Rather, the structure of the 
sciences is much more democratic. Different disciplines investigate different 
phenomena, some of these partially overlap and some do not. In short, I advocate a 
healthy pluralism. A pluralism which denies that any one science is more fundamental 
than any other. In effect, I am asserting that we may take the laws of the sciences 
whether they be quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry or neurobiology to hold true 
within their specific domains. We should not be surprised then that quantum theory 
holds for microphysics but modifications of the theory are required to understand 
larger scale events described by quantum chemistry and similarly that different 
theories are required to account for yet different phenomena not accounted for by 
these theories.
The general kind of view I am articulating has been most neatly expressed by 
Nancy Cartwright (John DupreI3for one subscribes to a similar metaphysical 
perspective).14 It is once again fruitful to consider the labours of God:
“Metaphysical pluralism supposes that God...is very concerned about laws, so 
he writes each and every regularity that his universe will display. In this case St. Peter 
is left with the gargantuan task of arranging the initial properties which will allow all 
God’s laws to be true together.” 15
One might wonder whether St. Peter is in fact redundant in Cartwright’s creation 
story. Logic alone one might think would prevent the laws, if they were true laws, 
from contradicting each other. (The point will depend of course on what ontological
13 Dupre, J. [1993]
14 One might also interpret Crane[1991] as a version of this view, although I think he may be better 
classified as bottom-up emergentist.
15 Cartwright, N. “Fundamentalism versus the Patchwork of Laws” in Papineau (ed.) [1996], p.324
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status you think laws or regularities have. That is to say, if you think a particular law 
obtaining is a fact about the world, the claim that all laws are consistent is no more 
than the claim that all the facts of the world are consistent, which I take it is a truism.) 
Obviously, though, in some sense the laws of say physics cannot straightforwardly be 
taken to hold in all circumstances for all events. Parameters of acceptability must be 
defined for their operation; the laws must be hedged. Cartwright’s own view seems to 
allow for this hedging by combining top-down idealist or social constructionist 
elements with her metaphysical pluralism. She, for example, converts Ian Hacking’s16 
slogan for ontological commitment, “if you can spray them, they exist” into the much 
more idealist sounding “when you spray them, they exist”. Laws of physics on this 
view only hold in the phenomenologically contrived settings of the laboratory; that is, 
they hold where they were designed to hold. So if one feels compelled, like Margolis, 
to eke out a special role for the human sciences this metaphysical view would be 
perfectly compatible with that stance. That said, I find the idealist overtones of 
Cartwright’s philosophy less compelling than its overall pluralistic motivations. The 
pluralist, I suggest, should attempt to make sense of hedged laws without recourse to 
idealist or social constructionist arguments.
However, before I begin to deal with possible problems for the pluralist in detail, 
I should explain why I think cross-ways emergentism is superior to the other forms of 
emergence I have considered. Essentially there were two criticisms levelled at other 
emergentist strategies. First that the emergent properties seemed miraculous and 
second because physicalists and bottom-up emergentists alike had adopted a 
hierarchical structure, physicalism seemed to be able to account for partially 
successful reductions that the emergentists could only accommodate in an ad hoc
16 Hacking, I. [1983]
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manner. The latter objection falls away once we have rejected the primacy of physics. 
Some physicalists might think is insufficient by itself; the explanation of one theory in 
terms of another seems equally mysterious on a cross-ways emergent model as on 
other emergentist accounts. But the metaphysical pluralist may simply reiterate the 
point made in section I: reductions where successful are partial and domain specific. It 
is perfectly consonant with the idea of cross-ways emergence that there are some 
reductions in particular in the areas where theories overlap. What the pluralist does 
resist is the idea that there will be across the board reduction of the sciences to one 
theory; he has nothing to fear from successful local reductions.
Similarly, once you have removed the hierarchical structure the first objection, 
that emergent properties are mysterious, disappears too. A property only appears 
mysterious, if we suppose it arises from a more fundamental level of reality. But since 
all levels of reality have the same status, no property is any more mysterious than any 
other.
Of course, I have glossed the situation somewhat. There are obviously 
difficulties that must be overcome. We have already encountered one: how can we 
make sense of the idea that laws do not apply everywhere? Another important 
objection that might be raised is what one might call the compositional motivation for 
all bottom-up ontologies (whether physicalist or emergent). That is big things are 
made of little things (of course exactly how they are so made is up for debate; hence, 
the contrast between bottom-up emergence and physicalism) and little things are 
physical things.
Let us first consider the compositional argument, what will the metaphysical 
pluralist make of that? First we have to decide what is meant by “physical things”. If 
all that is meant by thingness is spatio-temporal location then I think the pluralist can
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readily accept the argument. All concrete objects exist in space and time (this is surely 
what makes them concrete in the first place). But this should hardly lead us to the 
conclusion that all objects are fundamentally physical. The argument could be made 
more interesting if it were phrased in terms of properties rather than things. That is, if 
we removed all the physical properties of some entity (excluding the spatio-temporal 
properties), then that entity would cease to exist. The real question is in what sense are 
properties like spin, charm, charge, etc. parts of larger wholes and what sense does it 
make to talk of their removal.
I think the first thing to note, is that a lot of these properties do not even feature 
at the non-physical levels of reality so it is not clear what removing properties like, say 
spin might mean in this context. But that cannot be an adequate general explanation 
for the pluralist, since there are some clear cut cases of properties which do feature at 
differing levels of reality, in particular dynamical and kinematical properties. For 
example, as I move my hands erratically across the keyboard in order to type this 
thesis then presumably that is concurrent with the movement of physical parts of my 
hand (say the atoms of my index finger). The deep metaphysical question is what is 
the relation between these sets of movements.
I think the pluralist can admit several different types of answer. Perhaps most 
radically he can deny there is a connection between the two; there is a coincidental 
movement of hands and hand parts. Given what was said about the relation of 
quantum phenomena to macroscopic phenomena, I think this is less unreasonable than 
it might at first sound. The sub-atomic particles that make up my hand can qua sub­
atomic only be described accurately by quantum theory but how that theory can be
17related to hands qua hands is a mystery. Scott Sturgeon has some interesting 
17 Sturgeon, S. [forthcoming]
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suggestions about how we might consider hand and hand-parts to support a different 
range of counterfactuals possibilities, although in our world they are coincident. So we 
can for example, say that as a matter of fact hand movements are constituted by hand- 
part movements but atomic-hand parts do not cause hand movements (because of the 
partial failure of counter-factual dependence). The idea is certainly interesting but it is 
not clear why we should think the world is like this. I would prefer to develop an 
account we might have more reason to think is true.
We can I think achieve a better understanding of these issues if we turn to 
quantum theory. Given that quantum theory seems to presuppose the existence of non­
quantum phenomena to account for measurement type interactions, it seems to provide 
a neat case study of the general perspective a pluralist should take. (That is it seems to 
address the second problem, how we understand the fact that the laws of physics do 
not apply everywhere, as well.) Small things are accurately represented by quantum 
theory. But if we attempt to apply that description to large objects, notably measuring 
devices, our theory fails to recover our intuitive conception of the macroscopic image. 
Quantum measurement is best described as interaction between a quantum and a 
classical system. In other words, it requires us to hedge the laws of quantum 
mechanics so that they apply to the quantum system but not to the measuring 
apparatus. How this affects the general material composition of things is unclear. For 
Cartwright it would appear that we should not think of the hand as composed of sub­
atomic constituents. But I do not think we need make this claim, we simply say that 
given the way the systems are, the constituents of different things are parts of objects 
which have different properties and therefore fall under different laws. That is to say, 
quite simply there is more to hands than atomic hand parts. One might think this 
would again imply the sort of mysterious physical to non-physical connections which
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force us to accept “with natural piety” the emergence of the non-physical. But that of 
course would be contrary to the pluralist’s outlook; he denies there is anything special 
about the kinematical properties in the first place. So as I said earlier worries about the 
“spookiness” of property emergence do not arise, or if they do, they do so for all 
properties equally.
I have no general theory about how exactly it is that laws are hedged but I 
simply make the observation that this how the world looks as science describes it; 
different laws applying to lots of different situations. In particular, it is the way that 
quantum mechanics, our most fundamental theory, represents the world; that is, as 
requiring the intervention of something other than elements solely described by 
quantum theory in order to make sense of its results. In light of the relation of the 
quantum domain to the macroscopic domain, the hedging of laws is something which I 
find I am forced to accept with “natural piety”.
The account of metaphysical pluralism given above is obviously incomplete. 
There are questions that remain unanswered and room for disagreement between the 
advocates of the general position. This I just take to be the sign of a decent 
metaphysical perspective. What is certain though is it is a general view which is more 
consonant with the way the sciences operate now and what the various sciences tell us 
about the world. In that sense, I take pluralism to be the truly naturalistic perspective. 
The metaphysical pluralist directly observes the disunity of contemporary science (and 
indeed common sense views of the world) and he claims reality should be described in 
broadly those terms. Different theories, laws and entities should apply in different 
cases; and indeed, this is of course precisely what scientists and ordinary individuals 
do.
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CONCLUSION
I have shown that physicalism is not well supported by our current science. 
Some physicalist may be unperturbed by that conclusion. They may hope to justify 
their favoured ontological position by a priori methods. If so, I can only wish them 
luck. No doubt they will find good company amongst similarly high-minded dualist, 
idealists and a great many other “-ists” who seek to justify their conclusions by the 
same method. However, for those who prefer to muddy their hands in the empirical 
side of things, I suggest my conclusions should have serious repercussions.
We have seen in section I that science is neither unified nor shows signs of 
being unified; that even in what look like cases of reduction, there always appears to 
be some explanatory residue, some slack that has to be taken up by some other theory. 
We have also seen that physicalists are committed to explaining this lack of unity as 
merely an epistemological fact. That is to say, given a commitment to physicalism, 
one should expect reductions in principle. Such a position is of course entirely 
consistent. It is perfectly possible that the apparent disunity of the sciences and 
scientific explanations is just due to our lack of knowledge. However, I do not think 
this is very satisfactory. As someone approaching metaphysical questions from a 
broadly naturalistic basis, I do not think we should be so schizophrenic about our 
epistemological and ontological attitudes. If the world looks disordered, I say it is 
disordered.
I have, though, gone beyond even these considerations and shown that even 
where a physicalist would expect to find friends, within the discipline of physics 
itself, there lurk ghosts of non-reductivism. Indeed, there is something quite ironic 
about modem day physicalists lack of engagement or indeed even acknowledgement 
of the conceptual problems contemporary physics causes for their doctrine. Of course,
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these difficulties will never refute physicalism. Metaphysical doctrines are always 
vague and plastic enough to accommodate practically any scientific or empirical 
result. Die-hard physicalists will no doubt interpret my arguments as presenting 
problems that the programme of physicalism should, and will, overcome in time. But 
in light of my arguments, I do not see why we should be continued to be interested in 
physicalism. I do not see why we should attempt to patch it up to make it compatible 
with contemporary physics. Rather, I think the arguments of the first three sections 
should encourage us to turn away from physicalism.
Eschewing physicalism entails for a number of philosophers a wholesale 
rejection of the very general types of metaphysical question physicalists address. Tim 
Crane and D. H. Mellor1 argued there is no question of physicalism; that is to say, the 
concerns of physicalism cannot answer the interesting problems in the philosophy of 
mind: in particular the problem of intentionality. Lynne Rudder-Baker2 in a similar 
vein has counselled us to drop metaphysical questions and concentrate on our 
explanatory practices instead. I have some sympathy for such metaphysical 
deflationism. Certainly if it is meant to be taken as methodological advice, I whole­
heartedly embrace it. That is we should proceed in a naturalist vein, starting with our 
scientific knowledge and proceeding to our metaphysical view. However, if it is 
meant in a more wide-ranging sense, implying that the sorts of question physicalists 
are concerned with should not interest us, I cannot concur. It might be case that other 
questions are more tractable and of more immediate interest but that should not mean 
general metaphysical questions should not be pursued. A rejection of physicalism 
should simply encourage us to look for a metaphysics which is better justified by our 
scientific knowledge. I think, as I argued in section IV, that some sort of pluralism
1 Crane, T. and Mellor, D.H. [1990]
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provides the best alternative. But that presents us with many problems both in terms 
of compositional relations and understanding how the various laws of science can all 
peacefully co-habit without implying reduction. Pluralists need to provide a deeper 
more general ontological perspective than I have been able to sketch here. They need 
to address the problems of laws, causation and theoretical relations; and they must 
address these questions by detailed analysis of actual scientific theories and practice. 
Only when this done will we have a vigorous and viable alternative to physicalism. 
The road ahead for the pluralist is difficult. But as long as he sticks to the well-beaten 
track marked out by the empirical sciences, at least he will know he is travelling in the 
right direction.
2 Rudder-Baker, L. “Metaphysics and Mental Causation” in Heil and Mele [1996]
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